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THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF LAW
VLADIMIR GSOI'SKIt
Glancing into our social, political and economic future, former Dean
Pound recently warned: "One question, as men argue today, is whether
that future will call for a constitution or law or laws at all." The possi-
bility of an approaching agitation for the ouster of law is fairly deducible
fron current proposals of legal reformers.
In these uncertain times, it is of vital interest to the American Bench
and Bar to study the purposeful offensive in Soviet Russia directed to
the "withering away of all law." How fares this experiment to end all
law? Vladimir Gsovski, relying exclusively upon soviet authorities, reviews
the soviet concept of law from the Revolution to the present day.-EDI-
'rOi.AL Nom.
I
INTRODUCTION
OUR jurisprudence is now in the throes of re-examination and revalu-
' ation. Many basic concepts accepted until recently as the pre-
conceived principles of legal reasoning are challenged both in practice
and in theory. A tendency to treat some of these principles as an out-
worn burden rather than as a valuable legacy of the past, is very much
in evidence. The authority of Law and Rights as independent guiding
principles is occasionally overshadowed by extra-legal considerations,
social and economic. "Legal justice" is in some quarters frowned upon
as an obstacle to social justice. Economics, psychology and sociology are
called on to help jurisprudence.' It might, therefore, be of interest to
T Assistant in Foreign Law, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
The writer considers it to be his pleasant duty to exp'ess deep appreciation of the
valuable guidance of Professor Walter B. Kennedy of Fordham Law School in the prepara-
tion of this paper. Thanks to his generous advice and hearty coops.ration the explanation
of an intricate matter was brought before the American reader.
It is believed that the reader will be assisted by an explanation of the nature of the main
sources drawn upon and referred to hereafter. A list of these sourcez, prefixed by the
abbreviated name which will be used in place of the full title, iill be found in the Appn-
dix, infra p. 43.
1. Cf. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbol (1937) 46 Y,%r. L. J. 1290; Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL. L. RE%. S09; Arow,
SyXBOLS OF Go,.muams,"T (1935) 59-71.
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the inquiring mind of an American lawyer to consider the destiny of
the traditional legal concepts in a country where they have been denied
any authority whatsoever. Such is the case of Soviet Russia, because
the soviet leaders sought not only to get along without such traditional
legal institutions as property and inheritance but to get rid of law as
a guiding principle. It is the aim of this paper to discuss the problem
of whether traditional legal concepts, legal technique, and judicial proc-
ess withstood the test of social experiment in Russia.
A. General Survey of Peculiarities of Soviet Law
It is true that there is no single or unanimous concept of what we
call law which could be subject to a philosophic comparison with the
soviet theories. The numerous definitions of law to be found in tra-
ditional jurisprudence are far from being in agreement. Notwithstand-
ing all the varieties of theoretic opinions, however, there are some prag-
matic elements of law which enjoy a common recognition. When speak-
ing of law we have in mind rules of human action enforced by the gov-
ernment; in other words, compulsory rules. Then our modern concept
of law implies also a recognition of somebody's rights and primarily those
of the individual. For the sake of the protection of these rights the
rules of law are assumed to be binding upon the state no less than upon
the populace. In addition, law is still for us, as it was for Aristotle,
"the mean,"' the impartial something serving the common cause; at
least that is the purpose-the ideal-of it. Finally, the Anglo-American
concept emphasizes that the rules of law are those uniformly recognized
by the courts of justice.'
Yet, the soviet idea of law is strikingly at variance in all these points.
Even the first obvious element, the coercive character of law, was ne-
glected by the communists at the beginning, but the practical value of
it was soon realized and used.4 With regard to the rights of individuals
the soviet laws displayed a rather vague attitude which varied con-
siderably in different periods of the soviet regime. However, the pro-
tection of th& individual was considered secondary because, using the
words of Krylenko, "in all instances the interests of the whole, the duty
to safeguard the social order are to be the decisive criteria" in the
2. ARISToTLE, DE REPUBLICA, IV, 1: "In seeking for justice men seek for the mean or
neutral and law is the mean."
3. E.g., see: "The law may be defined as the body of principles recognized and applied
by the State in the Administration of justice . . . and acted on by courts of justices."
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) §§ 15, 39. "The law of the State or of any or-
ganized body of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is the judicial organs
of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties." GRAY, Tn-
NATURE AND SOUCES OF LAW (2d ed. 1927) 84.
4. See infra III, A, pp. 13-23.
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operation of the soviet law.' Again, in accordance with the Marxian
doctrine of historic materialism and class struggle, the impartiality of
law is denied altogether by the communists. Any law is for them in the
first place the law of the ruling economic class; 6 impartial justice is merely
an illusion and law reflects actually the class concept of justice. "Your
law," said Karl Marx, addressing the bourgeoisie, "is the will of your class
given the authority of a statute."7 Similarly, Lenin taught that law is
"the expression of the will of the classes which had won the victory
and kept the governmental power in their hands."" "The Soviet law,"
according to Gintsburg, a soviet authority, "corresponds to the interests
of the proletariat, organized into a ruling class." The communist party
is supposed to be the sole representative of these interests. "Hence every
problem of the soviet civil law must be treated from the point of view
of the interest of the ruling class, from the point of view of the policy
of the [communist] Party (the vanguard of the class) and the govern-
ment; it must be presented in the Party light and get a Party decision."0
Thus, the soviet courts were designed to render a specific "class justice"
and be guided in that by the communist party. In the minds of the
soviet leaders the soviet court is an organ of the dictatorship of the
proletariat exercised by the communist party. "The duties of the court
are identical in content with those of the entire governmental machinery,
the court has no specific duty making it different from other organs of
governmental power or constituting its 'particular nature' . ... t
The courts, like the organs of administration, are called upon to carry
out the policy of the soviet government and the communist party as well
as the Marx-Lenin doctrine."1
5. 1 KRxiLa-o, JuDIcmcaY or rHm R. S. F. S. R. (Russ. ed. 1923) 176; TLn Jrnicmn,
AzD T= iW (Russ. ed. 1927) 19. Kxylenko is a noted prosecutor and present Commi -ar
of Justice of the Soviet Union.
6. Ps .xAxs, DocnuNE 29.
7. ". . . Euer Reclht nur zurn Gesetz erhobene Wille curer Klasse ist . . 2" Marx and
Engels, Manifest der Kommunistichen Partei (1843), 6 B ,Mf't *.'= E cGEIS, GE&.s1rAofnnD,
(1932) Abt. 1, p. 541. The translation of this passage is by the pre-ent writer and cor-
responds to the Russian translation as quoted by the soviet writers. Publish-ed English
translations vary and are less accurate. Essm orzTLSO MorA=% (Lee's ed. 1926) 48, reads:
"Your jurisprudence is but the will of your clas made into a law." Lxu A,.D E:;cG=,
Co=auxzsr n-EmSro (Riazanoff's ed. 1935) 47, reads: "Your 'right' is only the will
of your class writ large as law."
8. 11 Lir.N=, CoLLMcra WORrS (Russ. 2d ed. 1929-32) 418.
9. Gm;rsBnuG, Counsa 44. Gintsburg is one of the leaders of the Institute of Soviet
Law and has been a recognized authority on civil law since 1929.
10. VX-sn- sn, Coupsn 7-S; see also V-smNsny, APL--Lri; Tr-,cnm-cs o:n Counr
AxND THE Sov=IT JUDIcARY (Russ. ed. 1934) 36; KRmYLnHO, THE Ju nC.A.y Or TM U. S.
S. R. (Russ. ed. 1927) 14-15; InvL-NKo, TE J :icLArY OF THE R. S. F. S. R. (Ru:. ed.
1923) 10, 15.
11. Gmn-ssUn, CounsE 121, 122, 128. "The guidance by the [communist] party of the
judicial activities is expressed in that it establishes the general principle of judicial policy,
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Consequently, the communists looked upon the legal concepts of the
traditional jurisprudence as a manifestation of the bourgeois frame of
mind."2 These antiquated concepts should be replaced by new ones
derived from the Marxian doctrine alone, leaving aside the legacy of
the legal philosophy of the past; theoretic speculation should be an inter-
pretation or further development of Marxian principles rather than a
product of free thought. However, Marx and Engels no more than hinted
at the concrete problems of law in their writings, which were primarily
economic and sociological. Therefore, strenuous efforts were made by
the soviet theorists to find a specific Marxian theory of law and to
establish their own pragmatic general concept of soviet law as a guide
for the practice of courts and administrative authorities.
Although the soviet writers on these subjects sought to derive their
opinions from one theoretic source-Marxism-no single soviet doctrine
of law has been achieved so far. The sayings of Marx and Engels
proved to be insufficient to build up a legal philosophy unanimously
adopted by their soviet followers. The soviet jurists had to resort
to jurisprudence in general although they mistrusted it. In this setting
one cannot speak of a soviet theory of law but rather of a number of
successive attempts to establish such a theory; especially so because
the opinion of the soviet leaders on the role of law in soviet life varied
in different periods of the soviet regime. Marxian philosophy and
soviet current policy were two potent-though occasionally contradic-
tory-factors which have influenced theoretic speculations of the soviet
jurists. The history of sovietism discloses continuous efforts to uphold
Marxism and to get rid of "bourgeois'-' legal concepts; but there is a
marked difference between the theoretic "ouster" of law and the achieve-
ment of this objective in practice. Successive periods will disclose the
stubbornness of traditional law, its rise and fall, ranging from complete
abolition to virtual recognition; and the ultimate outcome of this ambi-
tious program of the soviet state to outlaw all law is still in doubt. A
brief outline of the starting point of the soviet writers' search for a
theory of law-Marx' and Engels' teachings of law-will serve to intro-
duce the exposition of the soviet theories.
supervises their proper fulfillment and controls the judicial personnel." Vysnsmsxy, Couns.
24. This has not been changed with the new Constitution of 1936, although § 112 pro-
vides: "Judges are independent and subject only to the law." However, this clause is
interpreted by Vyshinsky, the present attorney-general, in his recent textbook on judicial
procedure, as a mere independence of the judge from personal and local influences, and
not from politics, politik or administration. VYSHIn SXY, COURSE (1936) 21.
12. "Marxism declares a merciless war against the bourgeois legal concepts and the
dogmatic method in jurisprudence." GINTSBURG, CouRsE 42; see also STucUKA, Tnr REvo-
LUTIMOARY ROLE OF LAW AND STATE (Russ. ed. 1921) 3. Stuchka was the recently deceased
President of the Supreme Court of the R. S. F. S. R., at one time Commissar of Justice,
a prominent and prolific writer on legal subjects, and Latvian by nationality.
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B. Marx and Engels on Law
The Marxian background of the communist jurists suggested under-
mining the importance of law as an independent factor, regarding law
primarily as a by-product of economic conditions. According to Marx
and Engels, the law as well as the whole of spiritual civilization is a
"superstructure" erected over the material "basis" which, in their
opinion, is formed by the relationships of men in the process of the
production of commodities. To quote their most important statements
on the subject:
"Legal relations as well as forms of the state could neither be understood
by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human
mind, but they are rooted in the material conditions of life."13
"Society is not based upon law; this is a juridical fiction. Just the reverse
is the truth. Law rests upon society, it must be the expression of the general
interests that spring from the material production of a given society."' 4
"In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite rela-
tions that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of
production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material pro-
ductive forces. Tie sum or total of these relations of production constitutcs the
economic structure of the society-the real foundation, on which rise legal and
political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social con-
sciousness .... With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense
superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."' 5
Thus economic factors shape and determine the form and content of
law. Everything outside of economy appears to be "the political, legal, and
other ideological conceptions"' by which men become conscious of the
material forces of production and the existing or coming relations of
production. According to Engels, "The jurist imagines that he is operat-
ing with a priori principles whereas they are really only economic
reflexes."'
"In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and
exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis
upon which is built up and from which alone can be e-xplained the political and
intellectual history of that epoch."' 8
13. LUIX, ZUR KIEx DER POuInCnEs' OsoxoMrr- (1877), author's praace vwlitten
in 1859. English translation by N. I. STONE, A Co,"mmutnRo: To TM CiauQz oz PoLr-
T'cAL. Ecoxoas' (1904) 11, 12.
14. M1arx's Speech Before the Cologne Jury (1849), (1923) LoUR AMo:,-nn 175.
15. Loc. cit. supra note 13. Italics supplied.
16. Engels, Letters of July 14, 1S93, and September 21, 1890, quoted from KvAh. MLwnx
AN F=anic ENr.Ls, Co EoPoNDENcE 1846-1895, A Sr.ncnro.. (1934) 475, 511 passm.
17. Engels, Letters to C. Schmidt of October 27, 1590, and Letter to Mehring of July
14, 1893 in ALw K A.N.- ENGELS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 482, 511.
18. Engels, Preface to lComruxisT M.irsso, dated January 30, 18S, in Essn-,;IAr..s
or MLARX (Lee's ed. 1926) at 28. A similar idea is eWpressed in Engels' 1833 preface to
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However, such symbols as "legal superstructure" or "economic founda-
tion" used in the quoted passages as al explanation for the connection of
law and economy, are substantially metaphorical and not explanatory.
When speaking about economic, political or legal institutions we deal
with certain conventional abstractions. In life they all are interwoven.
For example, one cannot accurately explain the law of copyright by con-
sidering the economic factor alone; social, legal and aesthetic arguments
are available to justify the protection of an author's creative writing.
When we class a certain fact as pertaining to the economic sphere and not
to the law, it means merely that we emphasize the economic aspect of
this fact, or study it from the economic point of view rather than find it
actually separated from facts which we class with law, politics, etc. Thus,
economy is no less a product of human reasoning than law or philosophy
and no more material or real. Marx and Engels, by elevating economics
above all other social relations, have over-simplified life and its many
ramifications.
After all, Marx and Engels did not define what they meant by those
prime factors which they called "mode of economic production," "rela-
tions of production," "productive forces," or "material productive forces"
in the passages above quoted. These terms are not at all clear by them-
selves, and the studies made by Marxists did not elucidate them. In-
deed, Marx and Engels themselves occasionally classed with these factors
phenomena which are rather remote from production. Thus, writing in
a letter, Engels included in economic conditions not only "the entire
technique of production and transportation" but also geographic condi-
tions, race and the remnants of the former phases of economic develop-
ment.19 Marx stated that "of all the productive forces the revolutionary
class represents the most productive forces.""
Moreover, the life careers of Marx and Engels lasted for nearly a
half century and their views underwent a substantial modification. From
the statements quoted above, it seems that originally they assumed a
more or less dominant causal connection between the "economic basis"
and the legal, political and other "superstructures," the former being
the cause and the latter the effect. In the letters of Engels, however,
written not long before his death, he admitted that he and Marx over-
Co uNvsT MANayFSTO (English translation of Riazanoff's ed., London, 1935) 261: "The
method of production and the organization of social life inevitably arising therefrom,
constitute in every historical epoch the foundation upon which is built the political in-
tellectual history of that epoch."
19. Engels, Letter to H. Starkenburg of January 25, 1894, in MARX AND ENOxSs, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 516-17.
20. "De tous les instruments de production, le plus grand pouvoir productif, eest la
classe r~volutionnaire elle-in8ne." MAPX, MzsiRE DE LA PHmLOSOPnz (1847) c. II, 5, 6;
6 MARX AND ENGELS, GESAmTAusGABE (1932) Abt. 1, 227.
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emphasized the importance of economic factors and sought to introduce
the following reservation to their teachings:
"It is not that the economic situation is the cause, and the only active one,
while everything else has a passive effect. There is, rather, mutual action
on the basis of the economic necessity, which always asserts itself ultimately.2'
Though the material form of existence is the primum agens this does not ex-
dude spheres of ideas from reacting upon it in their turn, though with a
secondary effect."22
"The economic situation is the basis, but various elements of the super-
structure are in many cases influential upon the course of historical struggle;
these elements are: the political forms of the class war and its results, the
constitutions established by the victorious class after its victory, etc., legal
forms and then even the reflexes of these actual struggles in the minds of the
participants, i.e., the political, juridical and philosophical theories, religious
ideas and their further development into systems of dogma. ' 2
Thus the relation between the economic basis and the superstructures
of law is far from simple in the Marxian doctrine. From Engels' state-
ment, it follows that though dependent on economy as the cause, the law,
though being the effect, may in its turn become the cause. In this way
the metaphors of "economic basis" and "legal superstructure" presented
in fact new and contradictory problems yet to be solved. However, it is
pertinent to note that these basic notions of Marx and Engels played an
important part in determining the general chain of reasoning on law by
the soviet Marxists and centered their search for the key to law in the
sphere of economics and material economic conflicts. A Mardst should,
according to Professor Reisner, "ascertain the specific relation between
the law and the economic basis, 24 or according to Pashukanis, "offer a
materialistic intrepretation" to the phenomenon of law.? Let us now
turn to the first attempts by soviet jurists to translate the theories of
Marx and Engels into the philosophy of law of the proletarian republic.
II
FIRsT SoviE-r TEEoRms OF LAW (1918-1929)
Soviet legal writers made a number of attempts to offer a constructive
soviet theory of law which would answer all these questions. The writings
21. Letter by Engles in ALR.' A- ,iD E x.LS, oP. cit. supra note 16, at 517. See aho
his Letter to Mehring of July 14, 1893, id. at 511.
22. Engels, Letter to Conrad Schmidt of August 5, 1S90, id. at 472.
23. Engels, Letter to J. Bloch of September 21, 1sgo, id. at 475; zee alzo his Letter to
Conrad Schmidt of October 24, 1891, id. at 480, 482. 1
24. Reisner, Theory of Law by Comnrade Stuchka, (1922) 1 Arzsnxr2m' or Tirm Com-
mrumsr AcAD= 173. See also Stuchk-a's reply, Deferse of Revolutionary Marxn Con-
cept of Law (1923) 3 lEssENG-- or i Coi.am sT AcsD. 159-169.
25. PAsHuEx~s, TnEiRO 16.
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of Stuchka and Pashukanis exceeded the others in importance during this
first period of the soviet regime because the rest of the recognized soviet
writers in the field of philosophy of law either followed Stuchka, like
Povolotsky;20 or followed Pashukanis, like Rezunov and Razumovsky; 27
or else confined themselves to mere criticism of the "bourgeois" theories
of law, like Ilyinsky. 8 Professor Reisner's writings should also be men-
tioned though his views did not finally gain official soviet recognition,
because he was the only Russian Marxist who tried before the revolution
to apply Marxism in legal philosophy.
Stuchka, one of the first commissars of justice, offered a definition
of law which was included in an early piece of soviet legislation and was
as follows:
"The law is a system (order) of social relations corresponding to the interests
of the ruling class and protected by the organized force of this class (the
State) .",29
The author of the definition himself, Stuchka, admitted that it is based
upon the "revolutionary feeling rather than upon theoretic study of the
problem."30 Yet he considered that it served the purpose of a practical
guide. To some extent he admitted that in his definition of law the con-
cepts of the German jurisprudence were virtually couched in Marxian
terms.3'
26. POVOLOTSY, MARIAN THEORY OF LAW (Russian 2d ed. 1925).
27. REzUNov, Maxsm AND THE PsYcHOLOGICAL SCHOOL IN LAW (Russian ed. 1931);
RAZUmOVSxY, THE PROBLEMS OF A MARXIAN THEORY OF LAW (Russian ed. 1925).
28. ILYINSKxY (BRUK), INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOVIET LAW (Russian ed. 1925);
id., LAW AND MORES (Russian ed. 1925).
29. Fundamentals of the Criminal Law of the R. S. F. S. R., R. S. F. S. R. LAWS
(1919) item 590, § I(1).
30. 1 STUCExA, COURSE 12, 13; see also STuCHicA, lc. cit. supra note 12.
31. Id. at 13, n. 1; STucKA, THIRTEEN YiARS or FIGHT FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY
MARxiAN THEORY OF LAW (1931) 2. To be sure, Stuchka's definition is an unfortunate
paraphrase of that by Rudolf von Jhering, who defined "law with reference to its content
as the form of security of the conditions of social life procured by the power of the
state." JERANG, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN' END (Husek's translation, 1923) 330. So Jhering
offered this definition not as an exhaustive answer to the question of what law is, but as
a characteristic of law by its content. However, Stuchka overlooked other elements and
aspects of law and state pointed out by Jhering [id. at 314, 3371 and, generally speaking,
made his formula more narrow and loose by introducing "the class point of view." Ac-
cording to Jhering, law secures "the conditions of social life" in general while according to
Stuchka "law is a system of social relations" necessarily "corresponding to the interests
of the ruling economic class" which is not always the case. For Jhering, law is protected
by the State; for Stuchka, by the "force of the ruling class." Finally, as was pointed out
by Reisner and Pashukanis, Stuchka's definition does not indicate any specific criteria
of law as distinguished from other social relations. If it is true that law is "a system
or order of social relations," what is its specific characteristic as a special form or kind
of these relations? Without an answer to this, they argued, the whole formula sounded
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Among the soviet writers, Professors Reisner and Pashukanis (in his
early works) gave the following criticism of Stuchka's definition:
The protection of the interests of the ruling class does not constitute,
according to Professor Reisner, any specific criterion of law. On the
one hand the protection of the interests of the dominant economic
class is not necessarily secured by law, and on the other hand the interests
of such a class are not the only interests protected by law. A given law
does not cease to be the law even if it protects the interests of the
oppressed classes, e.g., the labor legislation of the capitalist countries;
or if it pertains to a neutral sphere, e.g., public health or traffic regulations.
Thus, according to Professor Reisner, though any law is a class law in
that it represents an ideology of a class or group, it is not necessarily
the law of the ruling class. Nor does it operate to protect the governing
class. Law is a compromise "made of odds and ends of the ideas of
various classes, a multicolored tissue which is created on the basis of
the legal demands of various social classes." The soviet law was, accord-
ing to him, the co-existence of the bourgeois class law, the proletarian
class law and the peasant class IawY2 With reference to the letters of
Engels, Reisner emphasized that for the founders of Marxism, law was
primarily an "ideological conception" and must be studied by a Marxist
as such. A Marxist should find, according to Professor Reisner, "the
specific criteria of law as different from other ideological superstruc-
tures,"31 over the economic basis. His views were not shared by other
communist writers; they refused to see in law merely an ideology and
scorned Professor Reisner's views as an undue attempt to develop the
Marxian theory of law along the lines of idealistic, bourgeois philosophy.'
The writings of Pashukanis, another soviet theorist, are unsystematic;
his conclusions are rather indefinite and obscure and, besides, he changed
his views considerably in 1930 and in 1936. Therefore in the attempt to
give a clear resum6 of his views these defects could not be avoided.
Pashukanis agreed with Stuchka that law is a form of protection to the
ruling economic class, yet he argued that this protection constitutes the
contents of law while the Marxian doctrine must "give a materialistic
interpretation" to the phenomenon of law as a form of this protection.
Under the direct influence of the masters of the pre-revolutionary
Russian and German legal thought, Korkunov and Petrajicki (Russians),
and Jellinek and Laband (Germans), Pashukanis started with the propo-
like tautology: law (social relation) is social relation. Reiner, [or. cit. stpria note 24;
id., L.w, OuR LAw, Fonmrwx LAv, CommoT LAW . (Rusian cd. 1925) 21, 37 frtassEm;
PnsHuAn-us, TH .oa 15-17, 39 passim.
32. R sN-R, op. cit. supra note 31, at 1S4, 193, 244, 274.
33. Reisner, op. cit. s=pra note 24. at 173-174.
34. Rzzuzov, op. cit. supra note 27, at 85 passim; P,'siaus, Timorxr 31 i-s.rn;
RAmzovsrnY, op. cit. supra note 27, at 31.
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sition that rights are the postulates of law.3" But he sought to give to
the origin of rights an economic or materialistic interpretation in the
Marxian sense.
The idea of rights and consequently of law, appears, according to
Pashukanis, in the mind of the people at that stage of economic develop-
ment, where the exchange of commodities and production for the market
prevail over production for one's own consumption. In order to effectuate
35. PASHtT.ANis, TiEoRY, 37, 55; see also id. at 36, 41, 51-60, 90. A few comparisons
suffice to indicate the source of these ideas. The distinction between technical and legal
rules is from Korkunov: "Rules of law establishing rights and duties must be distinguished
from technical rules, which even when they come from the government and are compul-
sory, are only intended to show the best means of achievement of the object. . . .Rules
of expedience would exist even if human interests were not varied and conflicting . . .
even if there were only one human being in the world. Technical rules might exist even
then, but law would be out of question. . . .Law necessarily presupposes relationship of
various interests of several free persons." KorxUNov, THE UXAs AND T E LAW (Russian
ed. 1894) 236-237.
According to Laband: "Law consists in delimitation of the rights and duties of par-
ticular persons as against each other; by its nature law presupposes the existence of many
persons who may run up against one another." 2 LABAND, D, STAAzREC nrDEs DauTsmzan
REicis (1911) 181.
Likewise, Jellinek states: "Any law is a relationship between individuals endowed with
rights ... a rule is law if it delimits the sphere of the free activities of persons." JELLUNE ,
GEsETZ UND VERORDNUNG (1887) 195; see also id. at 215, 240.
The influence of Korkunov, Laband and Jellinek upon Pashukanis and other soviet legal
writers is shown in a most enlightening way in Dobrin's superb study, Soviet Jrisprudene
and Socialism, (1936) 52 L. Q. Ray. 402 passire. However, the Marxian aspect of Pashu-
kanis' efforts is left somewhat out of sight by the author as well as the influence by
Petrajicki.
Petrajicki was perhaps the most genuine Russian legal philosopher of the pre-war time.
His principal works are: INTRODUCTiON T THE STuDY Or LAW (in Russian: 1st ed. 1905,
2d ed. 1907, 3d ed. 1908); THEoRY or LAW AND STATE IN- CONNECTION WIrM A THEORy or
ETnics (2 vols., 1st ed. 1907, 2d ed. 1909-10). Petrajicki sought to establish a psycho-
logical criterion of legal rules as distinct from bare force, ethical rules and rules of social
etiquette. According to Petrajicki, law arises from the feeling of right and duty and the
inner compulsion attached to these feelings in the human mind. For him, the bonds of
rights and duties between individuals are primarily psychological phenomena, special legal
emotions of the persons obligated or authorized by law. By virtue of these emotions In
every action, which we consider to be our duty by law, we attribute to somebody the
right to demand its performance. A rule of law is, according to Petrajicki, different from
a rule of ethics in that the latter is merely outright imperative, that is to say, is a com-
mand, while the rule of law is not only imperative but at the same time attributive,
that is, it implies a real or imaginary person to whom the authority is attributed to ask
the fulfillment of the command. Hence, Petrajicki defined law as an imperative attributive
rule. Outer coercion is not a criterion of law, according to him, and the State is not
the source of law. Petrajicki advocated the resurrection of natural law in the form of
what he called the "intuitive law." Like Petrajicki, Pashukanis entered the analysis of the
psychological background of the legal bonds but sought to explain them by means of
economics. He also denied natural law theory of inherent rights. A splendid monograph
on Petrajicki in English has just appeared; see H. IV. Babb, Pe2oazhitskii (1937) 16 B. U.
L. REv. 793.
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the exchange, men must appear on the market as owners of commodities,
and equally authorized to dispose of them freely. MAoreover, the parties
to a concrete act of exchange give and receive in their turn equivalent
values. Hence, the idea of a contract as a free agreement of wills comes
from the barter upon the principle of value for value, and is therefore
not a manifestation of justice, but a bare economic necessity. These
economic experiences produce, according to Pashukanis, in the minds of
the people the idea of an abstract individual endowed with rights and
of men being equal in the exercise of their rights, which ideas are
postulates of law. "Legal relationship between individuals ... is merely
another side of the products of labor which became commodities" and
"the genesis of the legal form is to be found in the relationship of
barter.""6  Thus, Pashukanis advanced the opinion that the period of
capitalism, of a bourgeois society based upon free production of commodi-
ties for the market, is the very period of penetration of the idea of law
and rights into regimentation of various fields.
"Only capitalism creates the conditions necessary to enable the juridical
element to obtain its highest development in social relation. . . When the
whole economic life is based on the principle of the free agreement of wills, then
every social function in some way or other obtains a legal characteristic, that
is to say, becomes not a mere social function, but the right of him who exercises
the function."37
What was then the value of law under a regime which was supposed to
bring about communism? Pashukanis answered as follows:
"The withering away of the categories of bourgeois law (exactly the cate-
gories, and not of this or that particular rule) can under no circumstances mean
their replacement by some new categories of proletarian law."
36. PAsHuANIs, THEoRY 9, 42, 19, 23, 29, 69 passim, 113. Pasbukanis claimed to have
followed here the method of inquiry applied by Marx to the analysis of economic phenom-
ena. The following passage, though not referred to by Pashukanis, was probably responsible
for his teachings:
"In order that things may enter into relation with each other as commodities, their
holders must place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose will r des in
those objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the com-
modity of the other, and part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual
consent. They must, therefore, mutually recognize in each other private proprietor. This
juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract, whether such contract be payt
of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills, and is but the reflex
of the real economical relation between the two. It is this economical relation that deter-
mines the subject matter comprised in each such juridical act. The pa-sons exit for one
another merely as representatives of, and therefore as owners of, commodities." 1 UMx,
Csi'rrA. (tr. by Unterman, Chicago, 1906) 96-97. The same explanation of the phenomenon
of law is given by 1 GInBurG, Cours 239 pasm.
37. PAsKuA-Nus, THEoRY 19, 57; see also id. at 7, 71.
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This meant to Pashukanis:
"the withering away of law in general, that is, the gradual disappearance of the
juridical element from human relations.38. . ethics, law and state, are the
forms of a bourgeois society. If the proletariat is forced to use them it does not
mean that there is a possibility of a further development of these forms by way
of filling them with a socialist content. They are not apt to embrace this
content and shall wither away step by step with the realization of socialism.
Nevertheless, in the transitory period the proletariat must use in its own class
interests these forms inherited from bourgeois society and by this exhaust
them.... The proletariat must take a sober and critical attitude not only to-
ward the bourgeois state and ethics but also toward its own proletarian state
and ethics, i.e., must apprehend the historical necessity of their coming into
being and disappearance." 39
Pashukanis was not alone among the communist writers in seeing no
future for law with the achievement of communism as this idea was, to an
extent, suggested by Matx himself. Marx stated that every law "is in
general the law of inequality" and thought that when communism is
achieved so that everyone shall contribute according to his ability and
receive according to his needs "the narrow bourgeois horizon of rights
[law] can be left behind."4 The same view was expressed in the soviet
decree of 1919 on criminal law. There it was stated that with the advent
of communism "the proletariat shall destroy the State as an organization
of violence and Law as a function of the state".4 1 Then there will be no
classes, no State and no law. "Communism means," according to Stuchka,
"not the victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over any
law, since with the abolition of classes with their antagonistic interests
law will disappear altogether. 42
Goichbarg, the author of the Soviet Civil Code of 1922, went even
further and condemned law as a principle. He said:
"We refuse to see in law an idea useful for the working class .... Religion
and law are ideologies of the exploiting classes, and the latter gradually took the
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id. at 104-105.
40. MARX, CRTIQUE OF TRE GOTHA PRORAMM E (Eng. tr. 1933) 31. Pashukanis be-
lieved that "Marx viewed the transition to a developed Communism not as a transition to
the new forms of law but as withering away of any legal form whatsoever, as a dellverance
from this legacy of the Capitalist epoch which is destined to survive the bourgeoisie itself."
PAsHuKIAIs, TnEORY 23.
41. R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1919) item 590, preamble.
42. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATE AND LAw (in Russian, 1925-27) 1593. Here is another
more recent presentation of the same thought by a minor writer: "The State and the
Law are phenomena of a society divided into classes. Therefore abolition of classes,
transition from a class society to a classless society, means the final withering away of
the State and the Law in the higher phase of communism." Aleshin, Soviet Law and
Building Up of Socialism, (1932) SovIE" STATE No. 5/6, 51.
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place of the former. . . . At the present time we have to combat the juridical
ideology even more than the religious."'-3
Quite skeptical towards the value of law for the communists was
Professor Reisner. He warned against overexaggeration of the neces-
sity of legal formulas for their dictatorship, which is an actual situation""
Thus, it may be stated that all the leading communists share in one
way or another the opinion that there is no future for law under com-
munism. They dispute, however, the time when the disappearance of law
is to begin. The question is this: Is there a place for law during the
period of transition from capitalism to communism? What is the status
of law in the present stage of Soviet Russia, officially termed since 1932
as socialism, the presumed first step of communism?
In this way, theoretic reasoning on the nature of law has involved a
practical problem of the function, the pragmatic role of law in the soviet
state. Here soviet leaders went through an evolution which has ulti-
mately determined the present development of the soviet theoretic
speculation on law in general. Let us follow this evolution from the very
beginning of the soviet regime.
III
PRAGMIATIC SOVIET CONCEPT OF LAW
A. Period of Militant Communism (1918-1921)
1. General Characteristics of the Period. In view of the foregoing
theories what was the actual attitude of the soviet government to the
authority of laws both inherited and newly introduced? The soviet
leaders have admitted that when they seized the power in 1917 they had
no definite idea as to the status and operation of law under their rule."
As a matter of fact, the first decrees of the soviet government were not
intended to possess a seriously meant binding force, even in the eyes of
their authors. They were, according to the definition of Trotsky, "the
program of the party uttered in the language of power," and as such
"rather a means of propaganda than of administration."40 In 1917,
Lenin thought that:
"It does not matter that many points in our decrees will never be carried out.
43. 1 GoicimHc, Ecozomnc Lw (Russian 3d ed. 1924) 19, 8.
44. "We still do not know whether we need law, and to vhat extent v.e need it, and
whether it is necessary to gild the proletarian dictatorship and the class interest, for no
reason at all, with enigmatic juridical symbols and formulas." Russ mR, op. cit. supra note
31, at 29 passim, 34.
45. 1 STucHrA, CouRsn 36; Gomumano, op. cit. supra note 43, at 6; Knvxm:io, Tim
Junicmyr or Tim R. S. F. S. R. (Russian ed. 1923) 203; 1 Vs nsxy, Coupns 171 passim.
46. 2 TroTsxy, M Lnm (Russian ed. 1930) 65.
1938]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
Their task is to teach the masses how to take practical steps. . . . We shall not
look at them as at absolute rules to be carried out under all circumstances. '47
Yet, though the law is, perhaps, in some fields a product of economic
conditions, it was the change in these conditions that the communists
aimed at, and there was no way to accomplish this but by compulsory
regulation, i.e., by means of law. It should be borne in mind that during
the period of so-called militant communism, 1918-1921, an attempt was
made to enforce a rigid communist order. The government tried to be
the only producer and distributor of corhmodities. It intended to do
away with all private property exceeding the bare consumptive needs.
Inheritance was abolished" as well as ownership of land and buildings in
the cities with the exception of very small ones in the towns; 4 banks,
industry and commerce were nationalized, that is to say, converted into
governmental property or monopoly." Stocks and bonds were "an-
nulled" 51 and savings practically confiscatedY2 The government claimed
monopoly of all crops53 and full control of trade. These measures barred
47. 16 LENN, COLLECTED WORKS (Russian 1st ed. 1924) 149.
48. April 27, 1918, R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1917) item 456.
49. Decree on Land (November 8, 1917), R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-18) item 3;
Law on Socialization of Land (Feb. 19, 1918) id., item 346. The decree of August 20,
1918 [R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-18) item 674] authorized the city soviets to convert
privately owned buildings into property of the cities (municipalization).
50. As to banks, see decree of December 17, 1917, R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-18) item
150; as to industry, the basic decrees are of June 28, 1918 (large scale industry) [Id.,
item 559] and the decree of the Supreme Economic Council of Nov. 29, 1920 (id., (1920)
item 5121 which nationalized all the establishments employing over 10 workers or 5
workers using a motor; a number of decrees were issued concerning individual Industries
(e.g., LAWS (1917-18) item 559, 5461. Commerce by private persons was actually sup-
pressed and besides, by the decree of April 2, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Supplies
(Food) was charged with organization of the traffic in commodities. The Commissariat
had "to take," according to the decree of Nov. 21, 1918, "the place of private commerce
. . . providing for all the products for personal consumption and household." LAWS,
(1917-18) item 879.
51. Decree of January 28, 1918, R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-19) item 353; see also
decree of March 4, 1919 [LAWS OE (1919) item 108], and decision of the Arbitration Com-
mission attached to Council of Labor of Defense of October 16, 1924, 1 DEClsioNs OF TInE
ARBITRATION CorMIssION (in Russian, 1924) No. 490, p. 98; also NACIuMSON, PRACTICAL,
COMMENTARY TO THE CIVIL CODE OF THE R. S. F. S. R. (Russian 4th ed. 1931) 76.
52. Decree of January 28, 1918, R. S. F. S. R. LAwS (1917-18) item 353, § 10.
53. Governmental monopoly of grain trade was declared by the Provisional Govern-
ment on May 25, 1917. COLLECTION OF LAWS AND ENACTMENTS OF TnE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT (1917) item 487. All surpluses above the producer's own consumptive needs
were to be delivered to the State at fixed prices. The standard of these needs was, how-
ever, set at a rather high level: 50 pounds of bread grain for each member of the family
per month plus about 3 pounds of grits. This law, however, was not enforced. The soviet
Law on Socialization of Land (February 19, 1918) R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1917-18) item
346, confirmed in § 19 the government monopoly of grain trade. By decree of May 9,
1918 [id., item 4681, the soviet government set up broader terms for the confiscation
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practically any private initiative, extinguished the hitherto existing prop-
erty rights, and prevented their acquisition in the future.
But the most outstanding feature of this period is that actual dispos-
session and confiscations were more often made by the individual soviet
authorities on their own initiative and were neither based upon nor
followed by a decree or any formal act.
This highly decentralized, and one might say disorganized, character
of governmental activities of the time was sanctioned by the battle cry,
"All power to the local authorities." It was to an extent a concession to
the actual situation due to the general disintegration of governmental
machinery after the revolution. Many individual provinces declared
themselves independent republics and all of them were very loosely con-
nected with the central government.54
However, the immensely diversified practice in the execution of the
orders from the central government was a too obvious menace, especially
in the face of the armed rebellion of the populace that was going on. An
about-face with regard to law was made by Lenin in 1919 after some
experience in government, when he stated that "in order to bring an end
to Denikin and Kolchak '5 it is necessary to observe strictly our revolu-
tionary order, to observe religiously the laws and instructions of the soviet
government, and to watch their observance by all." ''  With the same aim,
it was ordained by the decree of November 18, 1918:
"To call all the citizens of the Republic, all authorities and officers of the
soviet government for a strict observance of the laws of the R. S. F. S. R. and
the enactments, resolutions, statutes, and ordinances issued by the central
authorities."' 7
Thus, to the soviet decrees was attached a binding force which, never-
theless, did not imply a supremacy of law as a principle. The same
decree of November 18, 1918, contained an important exception from
the proviso quoted above. There it was stated also "that the measures
not complying with the laws of the R. S. F. S. R. or exceeding them are
of the grain surpluses, and special troops were organized for carrying out the monopoly.
Decree of Feb. 27, 1919, R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1919) item 106. Lenin gave the following
characteristics to the soviet farming policy: "Militant communism consisted in that we
have actually taken away from the peasants all the surpluses and occasionally not only
surpluses but also a part of the food needed for the peasants' own con:umption.Y 26
LEmz, op. cit. supra note 8, at 330, 332. Concerning the abolition of p riate trade and pro-
viding for the populace, see decrees of May 27, 1918 [R. S. F. S. R. L~ws (1918) item 493]
and Nov. 21, 1918 [id., item 879].
54. See soviet writers: VLAD msrY, Or.uuizAno.: or THE Lo-%. Or..%cs o' n
Soviar Powm (in Russian, 1919) 25; Gurvich, Principles of Autonomy and Federalism in
the Soviet System (1924) Sov=r Lw No. 3 (9), 28.
55. Denikin and Kolchak were commanders of the anti-bohhevik armies.
56. 24 Lr.rn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 433-34.
57. R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1917-1S) item 908.
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,allowed" if they are "provoked by the extraordinary circumstances
of civil war and the combat of counter-revolution." But "combat
of counter-revolution" is not a transitory emergency but a paramount
proposition under the soviet regime. Therefore this section of the
decree opened a loophole for the violation of law by the soviet adminis-
tration. Thus this decree was the first manifestation of two diver-
gent trends which constantly are evident in the soviet jurisprudence.
These were the recognition of full authority of law, on the one hand, and
the admittance of executive freedom, on the other. However, the soviet
theorists and practitioners never defined the situation in so many words
but sought to find new ideas and new terms in determining the specific
role of law in the soviet state. In their endeavor to get rid of all law
the soviet jurists met insurmountable difficulties and were actually lost
between the two trends stated above.
Instead of outright recognition of the full authority of the soviet law
a principle of "revolutionary legality" was announced (Revolutsionnaya
Z&konnost', in Russian, translated also "revolutionary observance of
law") and the decree quoted above is generally regarded as the first
manifestation of this principle. However, in too many instances the so-
called "revolutionary expediency" was put against the, "revolutionary
legality". Finally at the beginning of the soviet regime the courts were
instructed to follow the dictates of a "socialist concept of law", or
"revolutionary concept of law", in rendering their decisions. Thus these
three unusual terms were designed to express the new, specific soviet
principles in operation of law. Let us now analyze what these terms meant
in the eyes of soviet jurists and in fact.
2. Revolutionary Legality Versus Revolutionary Expediency. It
may be noted that the term "revolutionary legality" has given rise to well-
founded objection even among the soviet jurists who were not orthodox
communists. Professor Trainin stated in 1922 with reason that:
"the law may be liberal or conservative, useful or harmful but the legality,
i.e., observance of law cannot be right or left, revolutionary or reactionary
* , *Legality means the attachment of a value to the law and is the same in
revolution and in restoration; legality is observance of law without which no
regular power can exist, be it bourgeois or proletarian."58
To this it may be added that from the viewpoint of modern juris-
prudence, the law binds not only the citizenry but the government; con-
sequently such a- slogan as "legality" or "observance of law" would
mean for us the supremacy of law over the discretion of authorities,
their "respect for law for the sake of law",19 in brief, the government of
58. Trainin, Revolutionary Legality (in Russian) (June 1922) 6 LAW AND Lirn 6.
59. JEERINc, ZwEcK Th! REcnT (1923) 297, 62,
[Vol. 7
THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF LAW
law. However this was not the purpose of "revolutionary legality"
which term acquired in soviet theory and practice a specific rather loose
meaning which, in addition, differed in various periods of the soviet
regime.60
As is evident from Lenin's statement, the obedience of the populace
and the discipline within the ranks of the government agencies were the
original purposes of this slogan. It sought to check the sectionalism
of local authorities. "The revolutionary legality," commented Lenin
at that time, "must be single. Legality cannot be one in Kaluga province
and another in Kazan province; it must be the same for the entire federa-
tion of the soviet republics.""' But the soviet government never intended
to tie its own hands by the law. And it seems, that by the addition of the
adjective "revolutionary" (or "socialist," as it is recently called) to the
word "legality" the soviet leaders have wished to emphasize the lack of
certitude and firmness of the soviet laws and their subordination to extra-
legal considerations such as the interests of the revolution, or party
policy. So Stuchka in his prime in 1919 stated that soviet laws are
merely technical instructions, like those of agriculture, the most general
passages of which possess a merely conventional force.02
Likewise, Archippov, the soviet professor, arrived in 1924 at the
conclusion that:
"Law and legality play a role in the proletarian state, but it is the role of an
instrument and by no means a role of ideal or slogan."3
According to the same writer, the soviet laws are elastic and easily
revocable, so that they are rather executive than legislative acts by their
nature. After all, until recently there was no formal criterion of distinc-
tion between legislative and executive acts in Soviet Russia. Five
supreme organs of government were supposed to exercise under the con-
stitution the executive power no less than the legislative0 The entire
60. "In different stages of the proletarian dictatorhip, the contents of the revolutionary
legality was subject to change depending upon the circumstances and the forms of class
stsnggle." Shliaposlmikov, Revolutionary Legality (in Russian) (1934) 4 Sovr SrAvn 46.
See also 1 Gin-SBuRG, CounpsE 14; also STAm, Ponim_ s ov LwImsar (Russ. loth cd.
1934) 113.
61. 27 Lnunsm, op. cit. supra note S, at 298.
62. Stuchka, Proletarian Law, in OcrorEa REvoLmrnoz Azm Tim Dxcr~xo.snw or T=u
PROLETARrAT (in Russian, 1919) 219; see also STUcHMzrL, REvoLrno0:sn Rom- Or rUE
Sov=' LAw (Russian 3d ed. 1934) 103.
63. Archippov, The Concept of Law (in Rusian) (1924) Sovnr" Law No. 2 (8), 41.
64. These were: Congress of Soviets, Central Executive Committee, its Praeesdium,
Council of People's Commissars, Council of Labor and Defense. Se Co: rrTiuo:: or mLu
U. S. S. R. (1923) with amendments. Although the new Soviet Constitution of 1936
reserves legislation to the jurisdiction of a single body, namely, the so-ca!lcd Supreme
Council, it has been pointed out that "we do not have separation of power. but the
distribution and separation of functions . . . it has nothing to do with DfontesquieuY
Vyshinsky, Stalin's Constitution (1936) SoCIALiST Lo.%Lrry No. S, 9, 12.
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soviet system is in theory the dictatorship of the proletariat, the com-
munist party being the instrument of the dictatorship which, according to
Lenin, is a "power unrestrained by any law and based upon force
and not law."' 5 Again, neither the organs of the communist party deter-
mining its policy nor the acknowledged leader, Joseph Stalin, have a defi-
nite legal status within soviet official governmental machinery, althohgh
party resolutions or even speeches are the primary sources of the soviet
governmental policy which is supposed to be followed by the courts in
particular.0 6
Hence, the strict keeping of law by the authorities on the one hand,
and the check of law from the point of the ever-changeable current policy
of the communist party on the other, seem to be extremities between which
soviet jurists were hesitating.
On the one hand, for example, Bukharin, at one time the leading theo-
ritician, now branded as a "right oppositionist", stated at the beginning
of the NEP period in 1923 that "Revolutionary legality means an end to
any arbitrary administration, including the revolutionary."07  On the
other hand, different opinions were also brought forward during the dis-
cussion of this problem in 1926. Soltz, a prominent prosecutor, advo-
cated that:
"We must check the rule of a law from the viewpoint of revolutionary expediency
which helps us in our work of the reconstruction of society along socialist
lines. The problem of expediency should dominate over the form of the law."
65. 25 LENiN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 441, 436; see also I id., supra note 47, part 1, at 124.
66. To quote the recent soviet text-book on civil law: "The sources of the soviet
law are: decisions of the organs of the party, joint decisions of the party and the govern-
ment, statutes, decisions of the courts and the arbitration commissions, decisions of the
central organizations of the trade unions and the co-operative organizations. ... Resolutions
of the organs of soviet power or laws are the most voluminous category of the sources
of soviet law .... The decisions and the directives of the party are the most important
(although not the most voluminous) sort of sources of the soviet law, and the civil law
in particular. It is true the party decisions are directly binding upon the members of
the party only. However, insofar as the party directs all the toilers in the country and
in the cities in their struggle for socialism and insofar as the party leadership is secured
by all the soviet, professional, co-operative and other public organizations of the Soviet
State without any exception, the party decision acquires a common obligatory character.
. . . Marx-Lenin doctrine is not an official source of law, and yet it must be used in
the most extensive way in the process of legislation (in law-making) as well as in appli-
cation of the law (by the courts in particular)." 1 GINTSBURo, COURSE: 121, 122, 128. The
Soviet federal Supreme Court recognized frequently the official authority of the communist
party. For example, it stated in its resolution of February 26, 1933, that "in accordance with
the directive instruction of the party, the resolutions of the government and the Plenary
Session of the Supreme Court, U. S. S. R. centered its activity on the sponsoring of the
social reconstruction . . . . the existing statute of the Supreme Court should be revised
and made fit to the fulfillment of the directive instructions of the party and the govern-
ment in the province of revolutionary legality." See Dr.czsioNs AND INTERPRETAT oNS oP Tz
SUPREME COURT Or TnE U. S. S. R., PLiNARY SEssioN 40-44 (Russ. ed. 1933) 4-5.
67. Quoted from VYsHmNcsY, REVOLUTiONARY LEGALITY (Russian ed. 1932) 16,
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To this, others objected that such a maxim may shake the obedience of
the local authorities to the central government and shatter the latter.C
3. Revolutionary Concept of Law. In any event there was, in the
first months of the soviet regime, no apparatus for law enforcement, nor
was there a body of laws for guidance. All the pre-soviet administrative
authorities, the agencies of the central government as well as the elected
organs of municipal and local self-government (zemstvo) became dis-
solved. The local soviets took their place. 9 The Decree No. I on the
judiciary of December 7 (November 24, old style calendar), 1917, dis-
solved all the hitherto existing judicial institutions en bloc, but neverthe-
less the old laws retained at first their force to some extent. The newly
announced People's Courts were instructed to apply the hitherto exist-
ing laws but "only insofar as they were not abrogated by the revolution
and did not contradict the revolutionary conscience and revolutionary
concept of law."7" It was evident, however, to the compilers of the decree
that there was no definite concept of law in the mind of the soviet judges,
so a note was added to this section explaining that those old laws are con-
sidered abrogated which contradict the decrees of the supreme organs of
soviet power (Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peoples'
Commissars) and the "program-minimum of the Russian Social Dem-
ocratic Party and Party of theSocialists Revolutionaries."
=
The next decree passed in February, 1918, omitted with reason the
reference to the program of the parties73 and substituted the words "social-
68. Cf. Yachontov, Revolutimtary Legality (in Russian) (1926) Sovxsn Lw No. 1
(19), 9-10, wherefrom Soltz's statement, which appeared in Iz1vsrsm (Nov. 24, 1925), is
quoted.
69. All the administrative authorities, the agencies of the central government and
the elected organs of local self-government were substituted by the local soviets. R. S. F.
S. R. LAws (1917-18) item 5, 1SO.
70. R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1917-18) item 50, § S.
71. 1 SrucnnA, Coupsa 37. Professor Reisner, who tried before the 'revolution to
reconcile Petrajicki's idea of "intuitive law" with Marxism, claimed to he responsible for
the reference to the revolutionary concept of law in Decree No. 1 on the Judiciary.
Ris-E, op. ci. supra note 31, at 21. He asserts that he inspired Lunacharky, Com-
missar of Education, who published contemporaneously with the decree, an article [The
Revolution and the Court (1917) Pra!D. No. 193] in which he advocated the idea of
creative power of legal conscience with reference to the non-Marxian leal writers, both
Russian (Petrajicki) and German (Jellinek, Anton Menger, Knapp).
72. R. S. F. S. R. LMws (1917-13) item S0, § 5, Note.
73. The so-called "prog-ams-minimum" of the Russian Social-Democratic party, :hich
consisted of ,two factions, bolsheviks and mensheviks, and of the Party of Socal-t Revo-
lutionaries, referred to in the decree of November 24, 1917, [supra notes 70, 71] were prac-
.tically identic with the exception of the agrarian question. The-e programs (as diffcrent
from "program maximum---socialism) were designed to be carried out by theza parties
within the capitalism and did not go further than a declaration of principles of an ad-
vanced democracy.
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ist concept of law" for the "revolutionary concept of law", 74 yet another
decree, July 23, 1918, mentioned again the "revolutionary concept of
law" as an obvious synonym to the "socialist" concept. "  Finally, the
Statute of the Judiciary of November 30, 1918, definitely prohibited
making any references to any pre-revolutionary laws in a court decision.
The soviet courts were ordered to render their decisions on the ground
of the soviet decrees, and in default of a provision directly bearing upon
the case had to supply it from the "socialist concept of law.M a
It may be stated that this part of the formula of this decree was in a
way reasonable. It is after all a commonplace of jurisprudence of any
country that in applying laws the judge has to interpret them and fill in
the lacunae of the statutes from his notion of what the law is, i.e., to
resort to his own concept of law. The adjective "socialist" used by the
soviet decree does not amount to any substantial change.
Even under the Imperial regime when the Statute was the prime source
of law the said authority of the judge in finding the decision was recog-
nized. The Imperial courts were prohibited to abstain from the decision
under the pretext that the statutory provisions in force be incomplete,
obscure, insufficient or contradictory and were directed to lay the
decision in such cases on the ground of "the general sense of law," i.e., a
concept of law.
It seems that in substituting the socialist concept of law for the
general sense of law, as a subsidiary source, the soviet legislators merely
74. Decree No. 2 on the Judiciary, R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-18) item 347, §§ 8, 36,
75 R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-8) item 597, § 35.
76. R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1917-18) item 889, § 22: "When passing a decision upon a
case, the Peoples' Court shall apply the decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government,
and in default of a decree directly bearing on the case, if the decree is incomplete, the
Court shall be guided by the socialist conception of Law. Note: No reference can be
made in the decision to the laws of the overthrown governments,"
Thus, the soviet legislation arrived at a complete break of continuity with the Imperial
laws and those of the Provisional government. This principle of separation has been kept
by the subsequent soviet laws, although many provisions of the old laws, especially those
of civil law, survived their formal derogation (see infra notes 93, 94). It suffices to
state here that since November 30, 1918, the pre-revolutionary laws ceased to be formally
a guide to the soviet courts. Other governments which came into existence in post-war
Europe in a revolutionary way recognized the continuity with old laws in a way some-
what similar to the American attitude toward the British law. The old laws were de-
clared to be still in force insofar as they were not abrogated by the laws of the new
government. This was the case in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,
and those parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which became incorporated into Jugo-
slavia and Rumania.
77. I.mPE'RiA. RUssIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1864) §§ 9, 10; IupsaA, RUSSIAN
CODE oF CRmDIMAL PROCEDURE (1864) §§ 12, 13. This rule was suggested by the § 4 of
the Code Napolon, which, however, did not definitely advise the courts as to the source
from which the lacunae of the statute shall be supplied. This section reads: "A judge
who refuses to decide a case on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure or insufficient,
may be prosecuted as being guilty of a denial of justice."
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took into account the obvious incompleteness of the soviet decrees of that
time. Leaving a broader space for the discretion of the judge was all that
the soviet formula practically meant. There was no intention to stimu-
late a development of a law of judicial precedents, of a customary social-
ist law. The government did not wish the country to be ruled by
precedent or custom but primarily by statute as a means of introducing
a new social order. The courts were not designed to be an independent
power. The significance of a precedent is extremely dubious under the
soviet law, as the recent writers pass over this problemrs while the older
writers were afraid the doctrine of precedent would be an obstacle to that
shifting of policy which is required from the soviet judiciary.70
At any rate the courts practically did not function during the period
of militant communism, being under constant reorganization. Five
decrees on the judiciary were issued in the course of one year changing
their organization, and three of them were not even enforced8 The
courts tried chiefly minor criminal offenses and occasionally divorces,
while the major part of criminal jurisdiction was absorbed by so-called
Revolutionary Tribunals and the Cheka, both institutions proceeding un-
restrained by any laws."1
78. "The role of custom is reduced to a minimum within the proletarian state under
revolutionary reconstruction of all the social relations:' 1 Guasunur, Coun-s 128.
79. "The judicial precedent loses its significance being forced out by written law.
The penetration of revolutionary dialectics into the consciousness of judges is important
above all in order that their practice .. . should not become ossified through blind ad-
herence to the letter of precedent. .. ." 1 STVcanM, Co1Unsa 189.
SO. See KR LEENxO, Ti JUccvRy or "raE R. S. F. S. R. (Russian ed. 1923) ,0, 62;
1 EsTRae, CouRsu or Tim Sovrr CPn=AL L.xw (Russian ed. 1935) 110.
81. Cheka is a coined word made out of the beginning letters of the Russian equivalent
for "Extraordinary Commission" (Chrezvychaynaya Korissiya, abridged Chre-vyhayha).
By Cheka is meant the Extraoardinary Commission for Combat of Counter-Revolution,
Sabotage and Breach of Duty by the Officials, which Commission, directed by Dzetzhinsky,
came into being some time in December, 1917, and enjoyed a de facto unlimited power
in penal prosecution. Its activities were not regulated by any law or decree but were
largely a matter of fact recognized by the soviet government. Here are characteriztics
of this institution given by the present Commissar of Justice, Krylenko: "The Cheha
established a de facto method of deciding cases without judicial procedure... In a num-
ber of places the Cheka assumed not only the right of final decision but aso the right
of control over the Court. . . . Its activity had the character of a tremendously mercilez3
repression and complete secrecy as to what occurred within its walls. The Cheha asrumed
not only the right of arrest and the right of a final decision over life and death with
no appeal against it, but besides, these decisions were passed by various 'five-member or
'three-member' collegia of the Cheka with no rule settling the jurisdiction or the pro-
cedure." KavL=zExo, THE JvJiICL!Lr or T E R. S. F. S. R. (RupSian cd. 1923) 322-3, 97.
Revolutionary tribunals, as differing from the so-called People's Court-, had an indefinite
jurisdiction over major crimes. "In the jurisdiction of the [revolutionary) tribunals,"
said Krylenko, "a complete liberty of repression was advocated while shooting was a matter
of everyday practice." Id. at 205. The tribunals were "not bound by anything in
selection of punishment" and by no judicial procedure. Decree of Feb. 17, 1919, R. S.
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Thus though at first sight the soviet appeal to the concept of law
(i.e., to the conviction of the judge as a subsidiary source of law) may
resemble the doctrine of the law of nature or the continental doctrine of
free judicial legislation 2it is far from these doctrines. It was not intended
to create law through court practice, nor have the courts actually pro-
duced law. Socialist concept of law meant practically the same thing
as revolutionary expedience, namely, breaking of rules for the sake of
the purpose of revolution. The more the central government gained
power, the more it wished to be the exclusive guide of all the governmental
authorities, including the courts, in the achievement of the revolutionary
goal.
Consequently, when during the next period a codification of laws took
place, the soviet legislator substituted, as far as the decision of civil
matters was involved, the governmental policy for the socialist concept
of law as a subsidiary source, and adopted with the rest the Imperial
formula. The soviet civil court was instructed to decide cases in con-
formity with the laws and decrees of the soviet government that were in
effect, as well as of the ordinances of the organs of the local authorities
issued within their jurisdiction.
"In default of a law or decree directly bearing upon the case the court shall
decide it, being guided by the general principles of the soviet legislation and
the general policy of the Workers' and Peasants' government."83
As far as the criminal cases are concerned the reference to the socialist
F. S. R. LAws (1919) item 130, § 4; id., item 132, § 1; id, (1920) item 115, § 1. They
were to be guided "exclusively by the interests of the revolution" or "exclusively by the
circumstances of the case and the revolutionary conscience." See R. S. F. S. R. LAWS
(1919) item 504, §§ 1, 3; id., item 549, § 33; id., (1920) item 115, § 24; id., (1919) item
132, § 25.
Under the molre liberal policies of the NEP the Cheka was reorganized into the GPU
(initial letters of Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or Main Political Administration).
R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1922) item 42. After the formation of the Soviet Union, a federal
GPU was created, called OGPU ("0" standing for obyedinenoye, or federal, united). In
1934 the OGPU was reorganized into the federal Commissariat of the Interior. Yagoda,
the former chief of the OGPU, was appointed Commissar of the Interior and all his lieu-
tenants in the OGPU received corresponding positions in the Commissariat. See U. S. S. R.
LAwS (1934) item 283; IzvsTnA (July 1-1, 1934). At the present time the Commissariat
performs four functions: secret police, investigation of crime, rendering of judgments with-
out any established procedure, and administration of all the prisons and other penal
institutions.
82. The most advanced manifestation of this doctrine is to be found in the Swiss
Federal Civil Code, § 1, where it is stated that the law must be applied to all those
problems for which a solution is offered by the letter of law or its interpretation; If
the judge cannot find such solution, he has to 'resort to the customary law, and in default
of the latter the judge has to decide the case on the ground of such a rule which he
would establish if he were a lawmaker following the established doctrine and tradition,
83. Code of Civil Procedure of the R. S. F. S. R., § 4, R. S. F. R. S. LAws (1923)
item 478.
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concept of law has been omitted altogether in the first soviet Criminal
Code of 1922 while in the later 1926 Code it was mentioned in connection
with the selection of punishment only. 4 But again, no doctrine or body
of rules is attached to this term, "socialist concept of law", in the soviet
criminal justice. It may be stated, in a general way, that the terms
"socialist concept of law" or "class concept of law" are used in soviet
jurisprudence in cases when a non-soviet jurist would say volition or dis-
cretion of the court.
Coming back to the period of militant communism, it may be stated
that "revolutionary expedience" overshadowed "revolutionary legality"
and private rights were completely denied. Problems of law were over-
shadowed by those of management of the multifarious affairs taken over
by the government.8 5
Speaking of this period, another soviet jurist said that perhaps the
contract of a village with the shepherd of the community herd was the
only relation regulated by private law to be found at the time.s This
is, of course, an exaggeration, the old law having shown much more vital-
ity. "We only imagined that we have abolished the law," admitted
Stuchka later.17  It is, however, characteristic of the contemporaneous
point of view of the soviet jurists, an admission of the permanency of
law even in a hostile environment.
B. New Economic Policy Period (1922-1929)
1. Civil Code of 1922. The New Economic Policy (NEP), announced
in 1921,8 implied a concession to private initiative, private property, and
in this way to private rights. It was intended to give a breathing spell
to the country, to let private enterprise work on the restoration of
economy, while the state kept the "commanding heights" in order to check
the growth of private capital as soon as it might endanger the communist
regime."' Thus Section 4 of the new Civil Code emphasized that private
84. CR=AL CODE OP THE R. S. F. S. R. (1922) § 24; CnnznAL CoDE oF T31 R. S.
F. S. R. (1926) § 45.
85. Archippov, Principal Phases in the Evoluion of the Soviet Concept of Law (in
Russian) (1925) SovmEr LAW No. 5, 30.
86. 1 GOICHBARG, EcoNxaIc LAW. (Russian ed. 1923) 3.
87. SrucRxA, CrAss STATE m CiviL Lxw (Russian ed. 1924) 9.
8S. The following decrees were the first manifestation of the new policy: Decree of
March 21, 1921 (changing the confiscation of grain surpluses to a tax in kind), R. S. F.
S. R. LAws (1921) item 147; Decree of March 28, 1921 (on free trade of grain, bread
and forage), id., item 149; Decree of May 24, 1921 (on barter), id., item 212; Decree of
May 17, 1921 (permitting private small-scale industry), id., items 230, 240; finally, Decree
on private property rights (May 22, 1922), id., (1922) item 423.
89. The main features of the new policy were characterized by Lenin as follows:
"(a) The land is kept by the state. (b) Same is true of the commanding heights in
the field of means of production (transportation, etc.). . . . (c) Free trade in the field
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rights are given to citizens, yet "for the purpose of the development of
productive forces" onlyY0
The period of the New Economic Policy (1922-1929) was studied
largely from the economic aspect. Its main importance was the limited
recognition of private rights. It is significant that one of the basic
decrees (May 22, 1922) which opened the new era and was the embryo
of the coming Civil Code bears the title, "Concerning Fundamental Pri-
vate Property Rights."'"
A partial denationalization took place; some of the properties (small
houses and small industrial units) were returned to the former owners
and any new confiscations were prohibited in the future. 2 An era of
extensive legislation was opened: civil law and civil procedure, criminal
of small scale industries. (d) State capitalism in the sense that private capital shall be
also attracted to the economic activities (concessions and mixed corporations)." 27 LrNIN,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 338; see also 26 id., at 340.
Stalin depicted the same period later in a very similar way, namely: "In the first period
of NEP we admitted a resurrection of capitalism, the private turnover (circulation of
goods), the 'activity' of the private merchants, capitalists, speculators. It was more or
less free trade limited only by the regulating activity of the state. The private sector
occupied an important place in the traffic of commodities." Speech by Stalin, In PRAVDA,
January 10, 1933.
90. "The government granted rights to citizens not in the name of some abstract rights
of the individual, but exclusively for its own purpose, this purpose being the development
of productive forces of the country," commented Malitsky, for a time a recognized author-
ity. See MALITSK, CIVIL CODES OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS (Russian ed, 1925) 7 passim;
id., (3d ed. 1927) 7, is slightly different. Recognition of rights even under such reserva-
tion was found later to be too liberal because "the purpose of the soviet law is not the
development of productive forces in general but their development in a definite direction
only, namely, towards socialism." See 1 GINT5sURo, COURSE 110.
91. R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1922) item 423. For a similar decree for the Ukrainian Re-
public see COLLECTION OF THE LAws OF THE UKRAIMAX SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (1922)
item 492.
92. The extent of the denationalization during this period raised a controversial prob-
lem of far-reaching consequences both inside of Russia and abroad with reference to
the so-called Russian cases tried in foreign courts. It lost its significance within Russia
only with the recurrence of enforcement of socialism in 1929. It cannot be discussed here
at length but its salient point may be stated as follows: The soviet government issued
a number of decrees where it was stated that with regard to some properties a confiscatory
decree or order issued during the previous period is in itself insufficient title of govern-
mental ownership unless it was followed by actual seizure of such property by govern-
mental agencies. Thus the seizure without a decree was elevated to a title and, vice
versa, properties confiscated but not seized were subject in many cases to return to their
owners. See decrees concerning industrial enterprises of May 17, October 27 and December
10, 1921 [R. S. F. S. R. LAWS, (1921) items 240, 583, 6841; concerning houses, Decree
of December 1, 1924 [R. S. F. S. R. LAWS, (1924) item 910]. See also ALEXANDROVS1KY,
COatMENTARY TO THE R. S. F. S. R. CivIr CODE (3d ed. 1926) 177; Gintsburg, Division
of the Property into That of the State and the Private (in Russian) (1929) REVOLiON
oF LAw No. 4, 33 passim; Timashev, Staatseigentum und Privateigentum in Sowjetrussland
(1927) N. F. 8 ARcIV FURK CIrvLisTiscEE PRAXms, 3 passim; also his Nationalisierung der
Banken in Sowietritssland, (1928) id., Bd. 9, 16 passirn.
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law and criminal procedure, labor laws, land tenure, negotiable instru-
ments, etc., became regulated in a short period by statutes, called CodesP
Any continuity of the rights and of the law effective prior to the
November 1917 revolution was, however, flatly denied by the new Civil
Code; thus Section 6 of the law enacting the Code "prohibited the inter-
pretation of the Civil Code on the basis of the laws of the overthrown
governments and the decisions of the pre-revolutionary courts."," The
pre-revolutionary rights were likewise cancelled by Section 2 of the same
law, which reads:
"Disputes arising from the relations pertaining to the civil law that originated
prior to November 21 (November 7, old style calendar), 1917, shall be thrown
out of the courts or other authorities of the republic. ' 'ss
93. The Soviet Union (U. S. S. R.) was officially formed in December 1922, and is
a federation of several constituent republics, originally 5, now totalling 11. The Ru&sian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (R. S. F. S. R.) is the largest among them, embracing
92.8% of the territory and 63.6%o of the population. The Civil Code and some other codes
were adopted by the R. S. F. S. R. alone prior to the formation of the Union. But the-.
and the subsequent codes of the R. S. F. S. R. served as a pattern followed by the other
constituent republics almost in every detail. The original constitution of the Union as
well as the new one of 1936 granted very broad powers to the federal government so as
to put it in control of the legislation of the republics. It may be stated therefore that
the soviet codes are uniform in basic principles, the differences, if any, betvn'cn the Codes
of individual republics being of secondary importance. Here the R. S. F. S. R. codes
only are studied as representative pieces of soviet legislation.
94. This section repeated in a more definite form the principle announced before in
the decrees of 1918 and 1920, quoted supra, note 76. This principle was not carried out,
however, at that time or after the promulgation of the Civil Code; the new legi-lation
could not fill in at once the "juridical vacuum" created by a lump abrogation of old laws.
Nor could the Civil Code and subsequent legislation fill at once all the gaps. For example,
the new decree on negotiable instruments was promulgated only on March 22, 1922 [R. S.
F. S. R. LA-,ws (1922) item 2851 while the instruments were issued by the nationalized in-
dustrial units prior to that date, and the disputes were settled according to the old rules.
Agency questions we're not regulated by the law of the U. S. S. R. until 1925. See Koblenz,
Agency Contracts According to the Civil Code (1926) Soviur JusrCE 'Wr. y No. 50,
at 1401. Moreover, a number of soviet laws contained provisions practically copied from
the pre-revolutionary laws. For example, the proviso of the Land Code of 1922 regulat-
ing the tenure of peasant households and peasant community holdings (nir) rep2ated in-
terpretations given by the supreme court of Imperial Russia, the Ruling Senate to the
General Statute on Peasants [9 Grn-s.%r. CODE OF L.%Ws or Tm Russxu Emrx (Supp.)].
Finally, the Civil Code did not regulate a number of individual contracts, e.g., bailment,
loan for usage. The old Russian legal concepts are occasionally noticeable in interpretation of
such contracts.
It is beyond doubt, however, that the soviet legislators aimed at a radical rupture with
the old legal order as a whole, and that they succeeded with the time to iszue enough of
their own law. The Imperial laws and those of the Provisional Government are no longer
a source of law in Soviet Russia, though some of the soviet laws have identical provisions.
95. Although the cancellation of all former rights was clearly stated and was seriously
intended, its strict application proved to be impossible. Some of the Rusian emigrant
jurists asked after the code was issued: what about a claim for compensation of a worker
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The cancellation of old property rights is especially underscored as
follows:
"SEc. 59, NOTE 2: The former proprietors whose property was expropriated
on the ground of revolutionary law, or otherwise has passed over to the pos-
session of the toilers prior to May 22, 1922 [the date of the decree recognizing
property rights], have no right to recover these properties."
In brief, the old private rights were not, as a rule, restored; the actual
dispossession was continued, but a possibility for the acquisition of new
rights had been opened. Private property later acquired was recognized
and succession rights, though in a limited form, were re-established. 0
Again, the recognition of rights was a matter of tactics and not of prin-
ciple. The newly acquired rights were made precarious in their nature,
for accident suffered prior to November 7, 1917, in a factory which later became
nationalized?
Such cases soon came before the soviet courts. An exception to the general rule was
made if the plaintiff was a toiler who suffered an injury while working prior to the
revolution, insofar as he was not taken care of by social insurance or did not have any
other income. In another case the plaintiffs, who were orphans, were acknowledged the
right to one-third of a house on the ground that though the house was purchased in 1916
in the name of the defendant, it was paid for with joint money of the defendant and the
father of the plaintiffs (orphans).
It was emphasized that the claims of injured persons should be satisfied in exceptional
cases. In other words, the pre-revolutionary rights might come into consideration only by
way of exception, dependent upon the volition of the court. See Zavadsky, Civil Law in 2
TrrE LAW OF Sovz-T RussIA (in Russian, Praha, 1925) 3 passim; Report on the Works of the
Civil Cassation Division of the Supreme Court, R. S. F. S. R. for the Year 1925 In (1927)
SOVIET JUsTICE No. 4; NAmHm5sON, op. cit. supra note 51, at 3; COLLECTION OF INTERrRETA.
TIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT R. S. F. S. R. (in Russian, 1932) 30-31.
96. The Civil Code as promulgated in 1922 sought to limit inheritance in the following
way:
(1). By setting in a fixed amount of 10,000 gold rubles the maximum of permissible net
value of an estate. This limitation was however abolished in 1926. R. S. F. S. R. LAWS
(1926) item 63.
(2). By a heavy progressive tax up to 90%, which is still in force.
(3). By restricting the circle of persons to whom the estate is descended by intestate
succession or by a will. Czv CODE § 418. These are: the descendants of the deceased, the sur-
viving spouse, and those disabled o1r propertyless relatives or strangers who were actually
depending upon the deceased for not less than one year before his death. The parents and
collateral heirs have not the right of succession unless they are such dependents. However,
the scheme of the limitation of the freedom of the testator (ius disponendi) was broken
through with regard to some properties not to be included in the estate and to be exempt
from the inheritance tax, including such things as insurance premiums, several kinds of
governmental loans, stocks, bonds, and the deposits with the governmental banks. The
owner may dispose of these freely, not by a will, but by a written assignment addressed
to the bank as to the person to whom the deposit shall be paid after the death of the
depositor. U. S. S. R. LAws (1929) items 75, 140; id., (1935) item 43; R. S. F. S. R. LAWS
(1935) item 111. Thus money deposits and governmental securities may be left to any
person in any amount.
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were not granted but "lent," being subject to recall. A conditioned pro-
tection of rights merely was promised. 7
These are the provisions designed to be, in Stuchka's wording, the
"Sword of Damocles"" over the newly created rights:
"SEc. 1: The law protects private rights with the exception of cases when
they are exercised in contradiction to their social and economic destination. '*'"
This destination was to be detected, according to the established
practice, from the current policy of the soviet government. Conse-
quently, any lawfully acquired and exercised right must have responded
to the existing politik to be protected.' A watchtower over the trans-
actions between private persons was erected by ordaining in Section
30 of the Civil Code that transactions which are legal in themselves and
have legal purposes are nevertheless null and void if "directed to the
obvious detriment of the State." Whatever was delivered by one party to
another in performance of such void transactions, reverted to the state
(Section 147). Many kinds of contracts had to be registered to be
effective.
Nevertheless, with all these and some other deviations from the
bourgeois standards, the soviet Civil Code as well as some other soviet
Codes offered definite opportunities for private rights. The soviet Civil
Code was after all a somewhat abridged version of the draft of a Civil
Code prepared under the Imperial regime, as a result of twenty years'
work °.'0
97. The underlying idea is made clear by the following statement of Lenin:
"We do not recognize anything 'private'; for us everything pertaining to the economy
is a matter of public and not private law. The only capitalism we admit is the state
capitalism. . . . Hence, we have to make wider the interference of the Etate with the
relations pertaining to the 'private law', to annihilate if necessary 'private contracts' and
to apply to the 'private law relations' not the corpus jtris romani but our revolutionary
concept of law." 29 LMIM, op. cit. supra note 8, at 419.
98. 2 S-rUCHKA, CouRs. 249.
99. In this point the compilers of the soviet Code fell prey to the teachmnp of Leon
Duguit, the modem French legal philosopher, who put forward the idea that "rights" in
general and ownership in particular are social functions rather than rights.
100. See G-reaves, The Socia Economic Purpose of Private Rights (1934) 12 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 165. A splendid study. Unfortunately the author primarily used material of
the NEP period and in this way failed to be abreast of the situation in Russia. His
general conclusion that § 1 of the Soviet Civil Code appeared to be, in the practice of the
soviet courts, a weapon less harmful for the private rights than intended by the frameas
of the Code, can be accepted for a period not later than, say, 1929-1930, when a new cam-
paign for socialism started. The soviet law as a whole presented lcss security for private
rights in 1934 when the article appeared than may be concluded from the article.
101. This draft was presented before the State Duma in 1913, but the war postponed
its deliberation. A part of this draft, containing about 1,600 sections, was reduced by the
compilers of the soviet code to 435 sections and a few sections were added which were
supposed to manifest the socialistic features of the soviet law.
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Even in those spheres from which private ownership was excluded, as,
for instance, land or large-scale industry, some semblance of private
property was recognized. Thus, by way bf a concession or lease a private
person might have run a large-scale industrial enterprise or might have
held real property under an hereditary leasehold in the cities up to sixty
years for the purpose of the construction of dwellings, or in the form
of the "toiling tenure" of agricultural land under the Land Code, un-
limited by any period of time.102 Domestic commerce was practically
free and subject only to heavy and arbitrary taxation.
There were new courts established which, in spite of numerous devia-
tions from the Western standards, had to be guided from now on by the
rules of written law, the Code of criminal and civil procedure and the
other Codes. To summarize, there was a voluminous body of substan-
tive and adjective law which had to be handled and applied in some way.
But as a whole the soviet law of that time represented (using the char-
acteristics given by Ilyinsky, a soviet writer) "a combination of elements
fundamentally opposed to each other, and nevertheless co-existing by
necessity."'0 3  These elements were socialism versus capitalism in
economy, rejection of private rights versus their admission in law.
2. Doctrine. In view of the flexible content and the mixed nature
of the soviet Civil law, interpretation had to develop, either individualis-
tic or socialistic in its elements. As the codes were promulgated after a
period of almost complete denial of private rights, their individualistic
possibilities were novelties. Some of the pre-revolutionary law professors
and lawyers, many of them Marxists although not communists, were
permitted to teach in the law schools reopened at that time, and to write
books and articles in a number of legal periodicals that sprung up-one
of them, Law and Life (Pravo i zhizn), being edited by non-communists.
They sought to introduce the traditional methods of formal, dogmatic,
or analytical jurisprudence in handling the problems of soviet law. One
might say a neutral, technically juridical point of view was admitted for
a time in the treatment of legal problems by the writers loyal politically
to the soviet regime. 1°' In the comments written by the old jurists, and
102. Land Code of 1922, R. S. F. S. R. LAWS (1922) item 901, §§ 11, 12.
103. ILYINSKY, INTRODUCTION INTO THE STUDY OF TE SOvIET LAW (Russian ed. 1926)
55; see also KANTOROviCH, THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF TIE U. S. S. R.
(Russian ed. Moscow, 1925) 11.
104. Among these scholars in the field of civil and commercial law the following were
active: I. Novitsky, Vinaver, Agarkov, Volf, Worms, Elyasson, Grave, Landkoff, Martynov,
Volfson, Kantorovich, Gordon, Mitilino, Shreter, Ashknazi; and in the field of criminal law:
Gernet, Trainin, Poliansky, Piontkovsky, Isaev, Lublinsky, Poznyshev; in constitutional
law worked Archippov, Margaziner, Diablo, Pletnev, Kotliarevsky. However, with the
beginning of the Five-Year Plan, all these scholars were accused of smuggling bourgeols
doctrines into soviet jurisprudence and were expelled from the universities, their writings
thereafter disappearing from the public view.
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in the application of the Code by the new judges who had no legal train-
ing at all, there was noticeable at first a tendency to safeguard the limited
possibilities offered to private rights by the Civil Code. Stuchka himself
complained that "the workers from the factories, when they were ap-
pointed as judges and came in contact with civil cases, and therefore,
with civil law, became themselves prisoners of these laws, became jurists;
the 'juridical logic' betakes them."105
It may be stated that the leaders of the soviet judiciary mistrusted their
own creation, the soviet law, which they had to apply; the value of law,
its binding force, were extensively discussed in the press and at all kinds
of conventions. 10 6 But the controversy of revolutionary expedience
versus revolutionary legality and the meaning of the latter were far from
being settled during the New Economic Policy period.
C. From the First Five Year Plan to Date (1929-1937)
1. New Policy versus NEP Legislation. Radical changes in the policy
of the government, which took place in the next period (First Five Year
Plan, 1929-1933), brought a further complication in the soviet attitude
towards law.
The industrialization of Russia was not the objective of this plan but
a means to an end, its primary purpose being the enforcement of socialism.
At the completion of the plan in 1933, Stalin stated clearly that the plan
was framed in order "to exterminate the capitalist forms of economy
and.., to create such an industry as would be able to re-equip the whole
of the economy on a socialist basis."' 7 Again, the Second Five Year
Plan (from 1933 on) was designed with the aim:
"of a complete abolition of the capitalist elements and the classes in general,
of bringing to a definite end the causes producing class differences and ex-
ploitation, and of overcoming the remnants of capitalism in economy and in the
minds of the people .... "I"
Thus the plans sought to bar private enterprise from commerce and
industry and to replace with collective farming controlled by the govern-
ment the independent farming of individual peasant households or their
communities hitherto recognized by the Land Code. In this period the
plans were directed against private rights granted by the entire legislation
of the previous period. However, at first the measures destined to liqui-
105. 1 STUCHKA, CoUsE 10.
106. These discussions are outlined under the caption Revolutionary Legality v, ersus
Revolutionary Expediency. See supra pp. 16-19.
107. Address at the Central Cosumittee of the Communist Party on Jatfary 7, 1933, in
STAIi, PRoBL--nS or L nsm (Russian 10th ed. 1935) 485.
1os. Resolu-tion of the XVIth Conference of the Communist Party, in R=zL.ov, Tim
Soviar STATE MM TIM SocLaUSr Socxar= (Russian ed. 1934) S.
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date the private tradesmen (so-called Nepmen) and the more or less
prosperous peasants (so-called Kulaki) were simply suggested by party
authorities without being promulgated in the form of a legislative enact-
ment. o9 According to the soviet writers the soviet legislation was con-
stantly lagging behind the policy of the government and this was viewed
by them as a rather inevitable state of affairs. 1 ' Yet step by step a num-
ber of isolated decrees appeared which vested the local administration
with broad and undefined power in the pursuit of the new policy without
abrogating the provisions of the Civil and the Land Codes which had
secured private rights. For example, the local administrative agencies
were authorized to confiscate all the properties of those peasants whom
these agencies considered to be Kulaki and banish them with their fam-
ilies."' Similarly, although Section 5 of the Civil Code, securing free-
dom of commerce and occupation, still remained on the statute books,
the local authorities were called upon to put an end to private com-
merce."
2
109. For example, Stalin advocated on April 6, 1929 that "Provisional extraordinary
measures are permissible . . . as one of the methods of breaking up the resistance of the
Kulaki and taking away from them the maximum of their surplus food." When dis-
cussing the apparent conflict between the existing laws originating from NEP period, and the
new policy, in 1930, he suggested that "consequently all such laws should be laid aside in the
regions assigned for integral collectivization of agriculture. . . In order to eliminate the
Kulaki as a class it is necessary . . . to deprive them of productive sources of their existence
and development (of the free use of land, of the instruments of production, of the right to
rent the land, and to hire labor, etc.)." Stalin, op. cit. supra note 107, at 267, 320.
Kulak (plural Kdaki) means "fist" in Russian, a name applied under the Imperial regime
to the "village bosses" such as saloon keepers, usurers, etc. The class of people named
Kdaki in Soviet Russia may be discussed only in connection with the soviet agrarian policy.
In a few words it means an independent small farmer who became more or less economically
strong under the NEP policy and had no sympathy with socialist experimentation in
agriculture; in brief, a small farmer of petty proprietor type like his colleagues in other
countries.
110. See Liquidation of Kulaki as a Class Viewed as the Current Task (1930)
3 SoviET STATE 10; VysiaINsnY, JUDcIARY 32.
111. By virtue of § 2 of the law of February 1, 1930 [U. S. S. R. LAws (1930) item
1051, power was granted to the provincial administration to confiscate in these regions all
the property including the personal belongings of those families whom the local soviets
considered to be Kulaki and to order their deportation. Their properties were to be turned
over to the collective farms as a share of the poorest peasants joining the collective farms.
112. The new policy of the so-called "soviet commerce" is in Stalin's words, "a com-
merce without capitalists big or small". According to him the soviets "eliminated the
private traders, merchants and middlemen of any kind. There may appear by virtue of
laws of atavism private traders who will use the commerce of collective farms. Moreover,
the collective farmers themselves don't mind speculating. But against these unsound
phenomena we have a recently enacted criminal law." Speech of January 7, 1933, in
STALiN, op. cit. supra note 107, at 505. This policy found its expression in a number of
laws on the "commerce of the collective farms" and the "combat of speculation." Contrary
to the practice of the period of "militant communism" when any selling, even by the
producers, was prohibited, the collective and the individual farms are permitted now to sell
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It seems that for a time the government itself did not arrive at any
conclusion as to how far the drive towards socialism should be pushed
and as to what exent the local administration could proceed on its own
initiative in carrying out broad and indefinite instructions! 3
At that time Vyshinsky, the present attorney general, sarcastically re-
jected Bukharin's contention that "Revolutionary legality means an
end to arbitrary administration,""1 4 arguing as follows:
"When we enforce revolutionary legality, we must always consider whether
our laws are in accord with the interests and needs of the proletarian revolution,
stressing this side of the matter rather than the formal element, the wording,
or legal formula."115
The same author stated in 1935:
"The formal law is subordinate to the law of the revolution. There might be
collisions and discrepancies between the formal commands of law and those of
the proletarian revolution ... this collision must be solved only by subordina-
tion of the formal commands of law to those of party policy." 1
Revolutionary legality became, once more, loose and indefinite and
subject, by principle, to qualification following the ever-changing "cir-
cumstances of the class war", that is to say, the policy of the soviet gov-
ernment 1 17  Pashukanis advocated the maximum elasticity of the soviet
laws, 1 and was supported in that by Krylenko, the Commissar of Jus-
their products directly to the consumers on the market places or to the government
organizations. U. S. S. R. LAWS (1932) items 190, 233, 375; id., (1933) items 25, 396.
Yet "the buying up or Teselling for profit [termed here as speculation] of agricultural
products or commodity staples is punishable by a term of jail or of concentration camp not
less than five years [meaning up to ten years], and complete or partial confiz-ation of
property'." Criminal Code, § 107, as amended by law of Nov. 10, 1932, R. S. F. S. R. Lw:s
(1932) item 365; U. S. S. R. L!ws (1932) item 375; IzvsTm%, Dec. 5, 1932, No. 335.
113. The collectivization drive suffered a setback in the spring and summer of 1930.
STr.,, op. cit. supra note 107, at 325 passim.
114. Supra III (A) (2), p. 13.
115. Vsnmcsx , VR oLuroxARY LEAL=T (Russian ed. 1932) 16.
116. 1 Vysmsxy, JumrDic_ or TH U. S. S. R. (Russian 2d ed. 1935) 32. In the
1st edition (1934), at p. 24, the wording is slightly different.
117. See notes 60, 66 supra and authorities cited infra note 121.
118. "Relationship of law and politics in our country is different from that in the
capitalist society. In a bourgeois society the superstructure of law must have a maximnum
of immobility because it represents a firm framework for a movement of economic forces
represented by capitalist entrepreneurs. Therefore, creation of accomplished single legal
systems is typical of the bourgeois jurists. It is different for us; we necd the utmoet cbs.
ticity of our legislation. We cannot tie ourselves up with any system because we are
every day breaking up the economic system. Politic is law; we have a system of pro-
letarian politic, but we do not have a system of proletarian law." Pashukanbs, The Situation
of the Legal Front (in Russian) (1930) Sov-r ST.%,E No. 11, 12, 47-43.
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tice."n Gintsburg, official editor of the standard textbook on civil law,
emphasized that the Communist Party decisions are the direct and the
Marx-Lenin doctrine the indirect sources of the soviet law to be used
by the courts and other authorities. 2 ' The same author as well as
Pashukanis did not cease to repeat that soviet law is in the first place a
form of policy, or rather politik.12' But this very politik became en-
dangered by arbitrary administration. Again the necessity of per-
manency of legal rules tormented the advocates of "no-law". Local
authorities were confused rather than guided by the contradictory
decrees couched in general terms and the flood of party resolutions. In
their zeal for communism some of the administrators went further than
proved desirable to the government, for the time being. For example,
they continued the enforcement of "agricultural communes" in villages by
compelling the peasant to pool in the collective farms not only the land,
implements, and draught animals, but also the living quarters, poultry
and personal property, while the leaders decided to abandon this form
of collective farming for a looser type of the so-called "artel". 122
Others treated indifferently or as a mere formality the instructions of the
central government. Moreover many of the communist directors of
governmental factories or farms and the managers of the collective farms
fell under the influence of evident local needs and gave preference to the
enterprises or people under their management over the governmental
assignments to such enterprises. For example, they stored grain or
distributed it more liberally among the members of the collective farms
instead of delivering it to the government.2 3
2. New Legislation versus Withering Away of Law. Two sets of
laws sought to meet the situation. On the one hand the criminal law was
put into operation to check the inefficiency of the entire economic system,
but on the other hand some concession to the ever-emerging private am-
bition was made. To the first group of laws belongs before all else the
notorious "Law on Protection of Public (Socialist) Property" of August
7, 1932,124 "the most important law for the strengthening of collective
farming" (in the words of Yacovlev, the head of the department of
agriculture) .125 The law declared the governmental property, railroad
119. Krylenko, The New Draft of a Criminal Code (in Russian) (1935) SOVIET STATE No.
1/2, 86.
120. 1 G1NTSBURG, COURSE 121-122.
121. See I GInTSBURG, COURSE 113; PASHUxA IS, FOR THE MARXIAN-LENINIST TiIEORY
OF LAW AND STATE (Russian ed. 1931) 17, 24.
122. Stalin, article in PRAVDA, March 2, 1930; see also his Speech of January 26, 1934, in
STALin, op. cit. supra note 107, at 325-327, 581 passim.
123. Postyshev, Basic Tasks of the Soviet Administration of Justice (in Russian) (1932)
SoVIET STATE No. 2, 11.
124. U. S. S. R. LAWS (1932) item 360.
125. IZvESTmA, January 31, 1933. Stalin also called this law "the foundation of revolu-
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cargo and properties of the collective farms "socialist" or "public" prop-
erty and pronounced them to be, as such, "sacred and inviolable." Capi-
tal punishment was imposed for what was termed "graft and stealing" of
these properties. It might be reduced under attenuating circumstances
to not less than 10 years of imprisonment. Practice and subsequent legis-
lation sought to punish not so much the attacks on these properties by
outside individuals, but rather to prevent the disposition of these proper-
ties by their holders (governmental employees or collective farmers) in
opposition to governmental interests. In the first place those individual
members or managers of the collective farms were prosecuted under
this law who disposed of crops or live stock on their farms instead of
delivering them to the government, or otherwise used them not to the
detriment of the farm but in defiance of the governmental program.120
Persons convicted under this law constituted twenty per cent of all
the convicts in Soviet Russia in 1932, according to the soviet statis-
tics. 127
Other laws sought to secure by means of imprisonment (from two to
five years) improvement of quality and proper quantity of the output of
manufactured goods, labor discipline and proper functioning of the
governmental commerce.'21  The meaning of revolutionary legality was
once more considered and Stalin explained, in 1933, that "the main pur-
pose of revolutionary legality consists now in the protection of public
property and in nothing else."'"" The official text book on civil law
tionary legality of the pre-ent period." STALIZZ, SPEzcIrs AID AnzCrS BE rwsr; TIM
XVW= A.D Tm XVIITH CorirNnoNs or Tma CommU.IsT P~xry (in Russian, 1934)
205-206.
126. The Central Executive Committee of the Union resolved on January 30, 1933, to bring
under this law: "sabotage of the agricultural works, larceny of seeds, subverive reducing of
standards of sowing, subversive ploughing and sowing, resulting in the pollution of fields
and in the reduction of yield, wanton breaking of tractors and machinery, and the destruc-
tion of horses.' U. S. S. R. LAws (1933) item 41. The Praesidium of the Supreme Court
of the R. S. F. S. R. recommended, on May 28, 1933, the application of this law to
"accounting officers and members of the boards of the cooperative organizations who failed
to take the necessary preventive measures against embezzlement." Id., item 9.
127. (1936) SocrAisr LEGALITY No. 8, 5; see also Esn , op. ct. supra note 10, at 140.
128. Law on protection of public (socialist) property of August 7, 1932, U. S. S. R.
LAWs (1932) item 360 (see supra note 125); law on responsibility of the managemcnt of
the governmental factories for the quality and quantity of the output of December 8,
1933, id., (1933) item 442; law concerning fraud in use of scales and measures of July 2S,
1934, id., (1934) item 325; law punishing the failure to follow the standards established for
industrial production, R. S. F. S. R. LAws (1931) item 162. See also the Echedule of dis-
ciplinary punishments of December 17, 1930 § 369 for the governmental enterprizes,
(1930) Nrws oF Tim CoaranssART op L.AOR No. 36.
129. Stalin gave the following comparison of the NEP legality with the present:
"They say that the revolutionary legality of the present time does not differ from that
of the first NEP period ... this is entirely wrong. The revolutionary legality of the NEP
period directed its point mainly against the extremities of the war communism, againt
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suggested that the discipline within governmental machinery and party
ranks is still the main point of the enigma of "revolutionary legality"
as follows:
"Revolutionary legality means a uniform application of the policy of the
party and the government as well as the strict execution of the orders and in-
structions of the organs of proletarian dictatorship in the whole of the
country.' 1 3
0
This sounded like a return to the concepts of the early days of the
soviet regime. There is, however, a new feature making the present
period different from both the Militant Communism of 1919-1921 and
the NEP period (1922-1929). Unlike the NEP policy, private enter-
prise is now completely banished from economic life; but unlike Militant
Communism, an outlet for personal ambition is given in the system of
socialist economy in order to make this system work. Whereas private
vested interest and private initiative are excluded from production of com-
modities, inequalities in their distribution are recognized by principle
and protected by law. Consequently economic inequality is fully ad-
mitted in Soviet Russia, although its reasons are different from those in
other countries. Profit-making is barred in that no private independent
enterprise is tolerated and the prospective earnings of the bulk of citizenry
are practically limited to wages; but the governmental scale of wages, be
it in money or comforts, is based upon profit-making as a motive to
stimulate the efficiency of work. 3' To this end the principles of piece
work and premiums for efficiency constitute the basis of compensation for
work in governmental industry and commerce182 and in collective farm-
ing.' 3 An elaborate scale of wages provides for additions to and deduc-
the unlawful confiscations and requisitions. It guaranteed to the private boss, the capital-
ist, a safeguard of his property, provided that he strictly observes the soviet laws. The
revolutionary legality of our time is quite different. It is pointed against thieves and
sabotage, against the grafter of public property. The main purpose of the revolutionary
legality consists now in the protection of public property and in nothing else." Speech
of January 7, 133, in STAra, op. cit. supra note 107, at 508-509 (italics supplied). For
the concept of public property see supra p. 32.
130. 1 GiNTSBuRG, CouRse 13.
131. At the XVIIth Convention of the Communist Party Stalin stated "that equalization
in the sphere of demands and personal life is a reactionary petty bourgeois nonsense
worthy of a primitive ascetic sect and not of a socialist society organized in a Marxian
way." STALIN, op. cit. supra note 107, at 583 passim. Prior to that, in June 1931, be em-
phasized that the differentiation of wages is an inevitable stimulus of the socialist industry.
Id. at 451 passin.
132. U. S. S. R. LAWS (1929) item 620; id., (1933) items 183, 242; id., (1934) item 109.
The last named law states that if a worker does not fulfill the standard of his production he
is paid according to the result without any minimum wages. If he does this systematically
he may be discharged. See also U. S. S. R. LAws (1935) items 293, 164, §§ 9-18.
133. The income of the collective farm is distributed, after the delivery to the govern-
ment of all kind of assessed products, among the members in accordance with the efficiency
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dons from the basic salary depending upon the efficiency and position of
the worker and in this way offers the managing and technical staff, as
well as skilled labor, remuneration in money and comforts greatly exceed-
ing those given to the ordinary laborer.1a3 Although any buying for the
purpose of re-selling is a crime, no matter how small and reasonable the
profit may be, 35 collective farms and independent farmers are permitted
to sell on the open market directly to consumers the surplus of their
products as soon as the quantity of these products assessed by the gov-
ernment for a given region is collected.130  Moreover, although the pre-
vailing majority of the peasantry (sixty-five per cent of all the peasant
households in 19331 7 is organized into collective farms, each household
in a collective farm is permitted to have a small plot of land (not over
2.47 acres) for its own independent "pigmy" farming and to maintain its
own, although very limited, animal husbandry '38  Land assigned to each
of labor of each member measured by standards established by the government. Each col-
lective farm is now subdivided into separate gangs (called "brigades") with more or le:3
permanently assigned land and implements so that each gang, and especially its leader, are
gratified with special premium from the income of the farm in case of efficiency; and vice
versa, their share is reduced if they fail to accomplish the established standard. Stand'ard
Charter of Collective Farms, U. S. S. R. LAws (1935) item 82, §§ 11-15.
134. In various branches of industry the laborers are divided into from 5 to 15 clarces
by their basic wages. In the metallurgical industry the highest wage class exceeded the
lowest four times. GPasan, Sov=-r L.ioR Law (Rtus2an ed. 1936) 173. If a laborer
occasionally gets 80 rubles a month, an engineer has 1,500 rubles a month. (1937) 16 Sormr
Jusrrcn No. 2, 16, 17. There axe in addition premiums, personal vagaz posibility of
holding two positions, lodgings, special restaurants for specialists, etc., and other variances
of comforts. E.g., see U. S. S. R. Liws (1929) item 620; id., (1935) item 277; id., (1933)
item 110; Order of the Commissar of Labor of March 11, 1934, in KLsr.E%; Corzxcrno:r
or TrE Mosr I-AmoRTA=T LAWs CoicmuuuGo L.AOR (Russian ed. 1936) 113.
135. U. S. S. R LAws (1932) item 375.
136. Each year the federal government determines for each region the amount of cereals,
milk, meat, etc., per acreage or head of cattle, to be delivered as a tax in hind. The quota
of each region is then assessed among the individual farns. Beginning with the harvesting
time, no private trading in crops is permitted until the quota assessed to the region is ful-
filled, or until the government issues a special law that the free marketing of crops i3 per-
mitted until the next harvest. See U. S. S. R. Laws (1932) item 233, 193; id., (1933) item
25, § 15, and item 396.
137. Statistics presented by Stalin to the last communist party convention in 1934 claim
that 657 of the present households are within the collective farms, powsesing 73.9' of the
total crop area. The independent farmers who constituted 355 possEss 15.5 of the total
crop area. The rest of the area (10.65) is in possession of the governmental farms (State
farm=Sovkhoz). S r.c .emc I, coRD or SrvN,-sm Zan Co.cGarmss o' ma A= -U:ao,;
Coinru PAr (in Russian, 1934) 20-21. Individual soviet writers assert that by April
1, 1936, the percentage of collectivized households reached 895%. See StctLy, Liqtidai 'ir.
of Classes in the U. S. S. R., Coac!aZCM G Tim DR=- or r n Co:-srrruno:n (in Russa
1936) 33..
13s. STAN.'DAmo CnARTa or THE CoLrrxcrnm FARMS §§ 2-4. The exact shze depends upon
the region. Except for nomadic and semi-nomadic regions of animal husbandry, no more
than one cow, two calves, two hogs and ten sheep can be in the private property of a
collectivist farmer. Honses as a rule cannot be such property in these regions. However,
from the soviet press it is evident that these limits are frequently violated.
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collective farm, though remaining governmental property, was declared
as having been granted to each farm "without any limit of time, that is
to say, forever."'13 9
In brief, the sphere of private ownership undoubtedly was considerably
curtailed as compared with the New Economic Policy Period. Private
property in objects of consumption seems to be the only kind of private
ownership to be "protected by law" under the new 1936 Constitution
of the Soviet Union.140  But a tendency is also in evidence to make this
limited ownership appear secure. The earning, that is, the supposed
fair compensation for the contribution according to one's ability may be
spent, at least in theory, freely for any personal comfort one can get,
but not for productive investment.
It was decided to stabilize the situation and the new 1936 Constitution
sought to serve also this purpose along with others. However, the new
trends have raised not only economic and political difficulties which can
not be discussed here, but also generated a set of controversial problems
in the operation of law and legal philosophy. The state of affairs thus
developed appeared to be in discord with the prophecies hitherto ac-
cepted as the basic principle of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin theory of law. As
one of the soviet writers stated it:
"The withering away of the State and the Law-these problems are put now
in a concrete way, in practice. These problems are transformed from those
of pure theory to those of actual immediate practical and political significance.
The decisions of the Seventeenth Party Conference [in 1932] concerning the
objectives of the Second Five Year Plan brought us closely to all these prob-
lems."14
The problem was this. Marxist-Leninism starts with the proposition
that private ownership of the means of production (factories and land)
139. Id. § 2. This provision was incorporated into the 1936 Constitution, § 8: "The
land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for perpetual use, that is, forever."
However, if an individual member leaves the farm or is expelled he loses his share without
any compensation. SrmARD CHARTER § 10.
140. The new Constitution, § 10, definitely promises the "protection by law" to the
"personal property of citizens" in the following objects only: "In their income from work
and their savings, their dwelling house and auxiliary household economy, domestic articles
and utensils as well as objects of personal use and comfort". It may be noted that the
term "personal property" (lichnaia sobstvennost) does not mean in Russian an antipode to
"real property" but rather to "joint property" and that the common law term "private
property" or simply "property" is not used here. Professor Goichbarg ascribes to this
term a special significance and contends that only "personal"--J.e, consumptive property,
and not the "bourgeois" private property-is recognized by the new Constitution. Goich-
barg, Personal Property Under Socialism (in Russian) (1937) 16 SOVIET JuSrICE No. 10/11,
22 passin. Cf. 24 LENIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 365-8, 377.
141. Aleshin, The Soviet Law and the Bilding vp of Socialism (in Russian) (1932)
SovIT STATE No. 5/6, 51.
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is the prime cause of economic inequalities and is the fundamental reason
for any other non-economic antagonism to be found in human society
and in the capitalist society in particular. Political, racial, religious and
other conflicts are supposed to be rooted in, and ultimately explained by,
the division of society into economic classes and their struggle arising
out of private ownership of the means of production. Therefore if this
ownership is abolished the classes would come to an end; and with that
determination all social conflicts and the law would be completely
erased.'42 Now the social order so far achieved in Russia is termed by
its leader, if not communism, at least the first stage of communism; a
form of socialism under which the means of production-industrial, com-
mercial and farming enterprises-are exempt from private ownership.1 43
They must be either outright governmental or collective undertakings
under control of the government. "The whole of the national economy
became socialist. In this sense we have accomplished the task of the
abolition of classes," stated Molotov, one of Stalin's chief lieutenants,
in 1936."4 It is true private property is done away with; classes, at
least in the capitalistic sense of the term, have been abolished. But
economic inequalities have not disappeared nor has class antagonism
vanished. Instead of a harmonious social life, the political, racial and
other antagonisms, the clash of opinion and interests, are more acute in
Soviet Russia than in any other place in the world; and within the com-
munist party itself these conflicts are even sharper than among the popu-
lation of the soviet land. Resistance of the populace, of the very toilers
-frequently concealed, it is true-rivals the opposition coming from
within the communist ranks. The sword of soviet criminal "law" still
hangs above Russia and strikes primarily the toilers in ordinary trials andi
the high ranking communists in political trials.'4
142. Aleshin, op. cit. supra note 141, at 51, 52. See notes 24, 2-, 37, 35, 43, sqpra.
143. "The chief basis of the draft of the new Constitution [of 19361 consists in the
principles of socialism, of its mainstays which have already been won and realized: socialist
ownership of the land, forests, factories, plants and other implements and means of produc-
tion; abolition of exploitation of the classes . . . work as an obligation and a matter of
honor of every ablebodied citizen." Stalin, Speech Presentbig the Draft to the V1lllth Con-
gress of Soviets, Moscow News. December 2, 1936. The same is stated in the Constitution,
§ 4.: "The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership constitute the economic
foundation of the U. S. S. R." See also §§ 5-7.
144. Moaorov, THE PiA; a,, OuR TAsK (Russian ed. 1936) 23.
145. It might be of interest to note that although "the class justice" protecting the toilers
was the aim of the soviet courts the very toilers were the first to suffer from the pro-
secution beginning with the earliest days of the soviet regime. Thus, in 1922 the Supreme
Tribunal complained that "the recent statistics for 1921 show that the major percentage
of those convicted by the revolutionary and military tribunals belonged to the peasants and
workers and that only a very small percentage of convicts belonged to the bourgeoise"
(in a broader sense). This ratio refers to all kinds of punishment, including -hooting.
CoLL EcTIoN or CmcuLARs or n SurPar=r Trmvv,*L (in Russan, 1924) 6. Statistics
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Thus although capitalism has been forced out of economy the above
quoted communist aim to "overcome the remnants of capitalism in the
mind of people"'1 46 has proved thus far to be inachievable.
The presumed cause of this state of mind, economy, has been changed,
but the presumed result, the mentality, human nature, still display all its
paramount characteristics. Weakness common to mankind, imperfection
of human nature was for the communists but the result of the division
of society into classes; but that it is still there, after the classes ceased
to exist in Soviet Russia, is admitted by the official organ of the commun-
ist Party as follows: "Egotism, indifference, laziness, cowardice will
survive the abolition of classes by which they were produced. In a
thousand ways they will penetrate into the mind of the child.1 147  A
soviet author of a study of the abolition of classes states more definitely
that for the achievement of communism "our communist work must be
directed towards the making of man over".14 But insofar as the human
nature has not yet been recast "class war" still goes on under socialism
in Soviet Russia.
The paradox of the accomplishment of the "withering away" of the
state by constantly increasing state power is thus justified by Stalin:
"Some of our comrades understood the theses about the abolishment of
classes, the creation of classless society and the withering away of the State as
a justification of laziness and good nature, as justification of a counter-
revolutionary doctrine of extinguishing of the class war and weakening of the
government powers. Is it necessary to tell that there is no place for them in
the ranks of our party? .. .The abolishment of classes will be achieved not
through the extinguishing of the class war but through its intensification; the
State will wither away not through making the government power weak, but,
through its utmost strengthening."49
On another occasion Stalin solved the problem as follows:
"The highest development of the government power for the purpose of pre-
paring conditions for the withering away of the government power, this is the
Marxian formula. Isn't it 'contradictory'? Yes, it is, but this contradiction
is life, and it reflects completely the Marxian dialectics."'150
So the withering away of the State and the law was not stricken out
published by the same tribunal indicate that among those shot by the sentences of this
tribunal, workers and peasants constituted 70% in 1923 and 62.5% in 1924; white-collar
workers, 21% in 1923 and 8.5% in 1924; others 8.5% in 1923 and 19% in 1924. SUPREME
COURT OF THE R. S. F. S. R. (Russ. ed. 1923) 26.
146. Resolution of the XVIth Conference of the Communist Party, op. cit. supra. note
108.
147. Editorial, PRA DA, April 7, 1936.
148. Komarov, Abolition of Classes (in Russian) (1936) Sovrr STATE No. 3, 11.
149. Speech of January 7, 1933 in STAim'n, op. cit. supra note 107, at 509 (italics supplied).
150. Speech of June 27, 1930, id. at 427.
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from the program, but indefinitely postponed until the advent of pure
communism and not merely socialism. With the announcement of the
abolition of classes some of the writers, judges, and administrators drew
the logical conclusion from the previous theoretic speculations that the
reign of law was at an end and suggested closing the courts or the dis-
missal of village soviets-the lowest administrative organs of the state.
But such ideas were severely condemned as an undue "leftist" deviation
from the doctrine.1'0
In other words the class point of view displayed all its vagaries1 2
It has proved to be no guide in the solution of social and legal problems.
In one sense classes have disappeared in Soviet Russia but in another
sense class struggle has been intensified, according to the soviet leader.
Not only landowners and capitalists were branded as class foes but also
peasants, workers and finally the dissenting communists. In other words
it is not the social standing but the frame of mind, the attitude of a given
person to the current soviet policy, that determines his class characteristics
in the eyes of the soviet authorities." 3 If socialism is the name of the re-
151. For example, some of the courts entered the policy of a wholesale disregard of laws
of the NEP period, but were called to discipline by the Supreme Court. Cor~arco:; or
INTPR=ATiONS OF THE R. S. F. S. R. SuPRE= CouRT (in Russian) (1932) 31. See also
Stucbka, Revolution and Revolutionary Legality (in Russian) (1930) Sovmr Jusncz No.
3, 15-16. For problems in regard to the dissolution of the village soviet, vse articles by
Riachov, IzvEsr , November 11, 1929, No. 209; DoTzEzxo, IRon Moscow (in Ruzian,
1929) 216; NovAxovsnv, Ox = PATH OF COLLrcnIZATIO:.; Rrz-mov, op. ci. suPara note
27, at 9 passim.
152. Mlarx and Engels have never defined what they meant by a "class". Two attempts
of Lenin at such definition are known to the writer, both vague and not germane to the
concepts now in vogue in Russia, as follows:
"What is a class, generally speaking? It is that what enables one part of the society to
appropriate the labor of the other. If one part of the society appropriatez all the land,
we have the classes of landowners and peasants. If one part has factories and plants, stocks,
bonds and capital while the other part works in these factories, we have the cass of
capitalists and the proletarians.' 25 LrLW, op. cit. supra note 8, at 391.
In this sense undoubtedly claes are abolished in Soviet Rusia. Another definition rcads:
"We call clases the large groups of people that are distinctive: by their Place in the his-
torically established system of national production; by their relations towards the means of
production (in the majority of cases fixed and shaped by laws); by their role in the
national organization of labor, consequently by their method of obtao:Eng their share of
national wealth which they dispose of and by the _qze of their share. Cla. es are such
groups of people of which one can appropriate the labor of the other, due to the dif-
ference in their position in a given system of national economy." 24 Lr:, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 337 (italics supplied). If we consider the criteria given here and italicid a num-
her of classes can be found in Soviet Russia as in any other country. Communis-ts, technlcal
specialists, the managing staff of the governmental factories, better and worse paid workers,
collectivists and independent farmers, professionals, all thee differ by their place in na-
tional economy, relations to the means of production, role in the organization of labor and
especially in the sze of their share in the national income if not by the methods of
obtaining it.
153. The classes came to an end in a sense, wrote Krylenko in 1934: "Do we have a
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gime in present Russia, socialism does not mean abolition of classes, be it
in the soviet or in the ordinary meaning of the word. Differentiation of
human society into separate groups, solidarity of their members and
mutual group antagonism arise out of an abundance of interests and
views which cannot be reduced to bare economic causes. The struggle for
power and dominance of such groups seems to be unavoidable and will
not disappear under any economic system. It is perhaps only the ten-
sion of this struggle that varies in different epochs of human history. The
state as a body politic, as an organization of political power, whether
moderating these antagonisms or suppressing one or another group or all
of them, depending upon the ideals of the rulers, does not show any signs
of withering away in any future within the reach of human foresight. Nor
is the law less potent than the state as a form of social control. A tacit
recognition of the permanency of state and law and an avoidance of
candid admission of the failure of the Marxian point of view-these are
the only conclusions one can draw from the quoted statement of Mr.
Stalin.
All the leading soviet -jurists now candidly recognize the theoretic
fallacy of the doctrine of "the withering away of all law", and especially
its peril in practice. The idea of "withering away of law" under socialism
became "opportunistic nonsense" for Pashukanis in 193 6,111 and is now
for Vyshinsky, Krylenko, Yudin and others "a subversive theory" which
undermines the power of the soviet state and suggests to soviet law
students a "nihilistic" attitude towards the soviet law.' Soviet jurists
class of landowners? No, it is destroyed. Capitalists? They are destroyed and ruined.
Businessmen? The private capitalism constitutes only .07% of our economic balance. The
kulaki seem to have been destroyed too. Where are the classes then?" And yet the idea
of classes being already abolished in Soviet Russia is "an error, a triple error" according
to the same author, because "there are no classes, but there are still people. . . .We did
not shoot them all down and did not lock them all up, we did not destroy them physically
and they remained with all their class sympathies, antipathies, traditions, points of view
and concepts. We have around us living people and many of them are living in tile
captivity of old traditions and concepts which over-govern their conduct; therefore, we
have to fight in this field also by coercion in addition to the propaganda and the rise of
the cultural level." According to him "with the progress in abolition of classes" dictatorship
of the communist party is facing another task in addition to "the suppression of tile
resistance of the former landowners, capitalists and the bourgeoisie.... This more important
task is the education of the toilers who are unbalanced, shattered, hesitating and bound by
the superstitions of the old regime and subject to the influence of the class enemy working
among us. . . .This task should be carried out also by compulsion." Krylenko, The Task
of the Courts, (1934) 13 SOVIET JusTicE No. 9, 2, 4; see also supra note 145.
154. "All talks about the withering away of law under socialism are just opportunistic
nonsense like the allegation that the governmental power begins to wither away the next
day after the bourgeoisie is overthrown." Pashukanis, State and Law Under Socialism
(1936) SOVIE STATE No. 3, 7. Observe the turn-about-face in the above statement by
Pashukanis as contrasted with the statement at p. 12, supra.
155. "They [Pashukanis and his followers] preached anti-party subversive 'theories' of
withering away of the state and the law. To disarm the working class in front of its ene-
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have now come to believe, perhaps with reason, that the neglect of
statutes by the soviet judges, their meager knowledge of soviet law and
the inferior quality of their judicial work is the result of this theory. 50
Leading men in the legal profession no longer wish that the revolu-
tionary expediency of a soviet law be questioned by those who are called
upon to enforce it.157  Nor is maximum flexibility of soviet laws advo-
cated."as The soviet leaders propose that the laws of the soviet state now
be granted full authority, that they be made firm and stable.' On the
other hand, soviet jurists attempt to clear soviet law of all the hitherto
raised suspicions that it has ever been, even partially, bourgeois and not
socialistic."' To elevate the authority of soviet law, it is now defined in
terms resembling idealistic Hegelian philosophy as "the expression of the
will" of the toilers, or of the "socialist nation".10' Moreover, the study
mies, to undermine the governmental might of socialism--that was the aim of these attempts.
To the students, the growing cadres, a nihilistic attitude to the soviet law was suggested."
Vyshinsky, About the Situation on the Front ot Legal Theory (1937) Socmwsr Lm.=ur-
No. 5, 31. See also Antonov-Saratovsky, On some Methods of lWreching on the Juridical
Front (May 8, 1937) IzvrsrAm No. 107; Yudin, Against Confusion, Ridicdousnress and
Revisionism (Jan. 20, 1937) Ps!L-.).
156. Manikovsky, Against the Anti-Marxian Theory in Crimiral LarX (1937) SociaLiST
LEALv No. 5, 44.
The following figures, referring to 1935 and 1936, are characteristic of the education of
the soviet judges: only 5.8% of them are graduates of any law schools; 1.59 had a one-
year course in law; and 41.7% had only a six months' course in law, so that 51.150 had no
legal training at all. Moreover, 62.2% of all the judges of the higher courts had barely
elementary education, while in the lower courts this percentage was as high as 84.6%. See
(1936) Soviur STATE No. 5, 115; (1935) 15 SOVIr JUsTIc. No. 35, 4-5. Illiteracy of judg-
ments rendered, violation of law and rights of the prisoners, and similar fundamental
defects in the administration of justice are continuously described in the circular ltters
of the soviet supreme court and law re-iews. See L',rn Rsrt vo!;s LzD DErcso! s or Trm
U. S. S. R. Supmnm CouaT (in Russian, 1932) 19; (1934) SOcILST LE m TY.m No. 8, 3, 32,
34; id., No. 3, 8; (1934) 14 Sovmr JusrcE No. 21, 5; (1935) id. No. 2; (1934) Soxi r SrTTE
No. 4, 50.
157. Editorial, (March 17, 1937) IzvrTsr No. 115; Vyshinsky, Stalin's Constitution
(1936) Soc.Luisr LEGA= No. 8, 16.
158. See supra notes 114, 115, 118.
159. "And now more than ever before there is a need for stability of laws." Stalin,
Speech at VlIth Congress of Soviets (1936) Moscow Nmnvs No. 43; sen also Pashulmnis,
Stalin's Constitutimz of Law (1936) SovE-r STATE No. 4, 23, 25. "The citizens of the
Soviet Union must be sure of the firmness of the soviet law... " Editorial, ('May 17,
1937) Izvs sA No. 115.
160. "We can and must speak of our law as a socialist law insofar as it has always
been from the very beginning an instrument of socialist reconstruction of the society and so
it remains." Krylenko, Stalin's Constitution md the Task of the Soviet Judiciar, (1937)
16 SoviET JusIcE No. 5, 5. See similar statements in Pashukanis, State and Law Under
Socialism (1937) Soviat STATE No. 3, 10; 1 Gn-,rsnvrG, Counsu 11, 12, 114.
161. "Law as different from an administrative ordinance represents the most abrtmct
expression of the will and the conscience of the toilers. . . . Law is the most general and
most authoritative e-xpression of the will of the socialist nation." Pashukanis, Stalin's
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of "socialist law" in connection with "socialist ethics" and not merely
economic necessity, is part of the present program.0 2 And soviet jurists
now assign a creative role to the law under socialism, no longer regarding
it as a mere reflex of economy, according to Marx' original sugges-
tion. 63
In brief, all the hitherto made attempts to establish a Marxist-
Leninist theory of law are now condemned and the former leading
writer, Pashukanis, has been declared an "enemy of the people" in 1937,
despite the fact that he himself vehemently repudiated his former writ-
ings in 1936. Not only he, but his former followers and present critics
as well, had arrived in 1936 at a unanimous conclusion that the search
for Marxist-Leninist legal doctrine had to be started all over again.'"
In summarizing the evolution of soviet legal thought, it may be stated
that the concepts of traditional jurisprudence which form the technique
of legal reasoning are at this time reinstated in the soviet doctrine of law.
Marxism, offered as a comprehensive single concept of life, a Weltan-
schauung, implying its own answer in any field of social sciences, has
proved to be futile for jurisprudence. No longer desiring to create their
own set of technical legal devices, soviet jurists are content to accept the
traditional.
However, if one questions what the new shift in theory may amount to
in practice, or more specifically, whether the traditional concept of law
means the recognition of rights, no change is in sight. Law is still viewed
primarily as an instrument of rulership, and not the guardian of rights.
The very soul of law is thereby negatived. The new Constitution of the
Soviet Union of 1936 is not designed to alter the primary cause of the
neglect of rights in Soviet Russia, namely, the dictatorial concept of
governmental power.
In thd words of the present Attorney-General of the Soviet Union,
Vyshinsky: "Proletarian dictatorship is the supreme law which determines
the concrete contents of all the soviet laws." 5. . . A fundamental error is
Constitution and the Socialist Legality (1936) SoviE" STAi No. 4, 24, 27. See also Con-
cerning the Situation on the Front of Theory of Law (1937) 16 Sovar JuslICE No. 8, 2.
There is no difference between this concept and the so-called Voluntarist doctrine of law in
German idealist jurisprudence. See, for example, the following definition by Dernburg:
"Law in an objective sense is that order of the relations of life which is secured by the
general will." 1 DERNBURG, DAs BuERGERLicnE REcnr (3d ed. 1906) 47. Only the will of
one class of the population is substituted for the general will by Krylenko and Pashukanis.
162. See (1937) 16 SoviET Juscx= No. 8, 6; also PASHUxANIS, op. cit. supra note
160, at 11.
163. "The law of the proletarian state is a creative force which helps the birth of the
new social relations." VYsHNsK', JuDIcrARY 32. See also 1 GiNsBUR0, COURSE 193, 113.
See I (B) supra, p. 5.
164. Vyshinsky, Stalin's Constitution (1936) SocinlIST LEoAI T No. 8, 17; Pashukanis,
State and Law (1936) SovIET STATE No. 8, 9.
165. VYsnasK'Y, JUDIcIARY 31.
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made by those who think that the principle of proletarian democracy
which is expressed in the new Constitution limits in any way the principle
of proletarian dictatorship."160 According to Stalin, the new Constitution
"leaves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist
party."'6 Thus the proletarian dictatorship is still the dictatorship of
the communist Party alone.
Consequently although now the soviet jurists wish to use the traditional
legal concepts, they are still in pursuit of the particular purpose of "class
justice" which is not germane to these concepts, and they are not pre-
pared to inscribe on their banner the real supremacy of law and rights.
They take the body of traditional jurisprudence but repudiate its soul.
In this, their recent way of reasoning does not differ substantially from
their former views. Thus the victory of the traditional concepts in soviet
jurisprudence over the soviet Marxian innovators is rather one-sided.
The soviet statute is now the law in the eyes of the soviet jurists, but this
law is devoid of the basic concept of rights.
APPENDIX
The following is a list of the main authorities used in this papcr. The first rame &en
is, in most cases, the abbreviated English title which has been used throughout.
Gn-I"SBURG, CouRsE. KuRs So-TsroGo Knzousrv oo PrPWA (pod redaltridd Gints-
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Communist Academy with the collaboration of Gintsburg, Raevich, Karras, Amfiteatrov,
Bratus, Fuks and Slivitsky. Two volumes published.
Izv.EsTm.. Official gazette of the Soviet Union.
PAsixu.=s, Docrm Ucnum= o GosumnnsrvE i P&%wa (pod red. Pashukana, Lenin-
grad, 1932) [Doctrine of the State and the Law (ed. by Pashukanis)]. A collective work
published by the Institute of Law of the Communist Academy under the editorship and
with the collaboration of Pashukanis.
PAsnuR;.,is, TuaoRy. PAsHurn.-is, OBsHem A Tzonm PrAv% x MArsism (General theory
of Law and Mar dsm]. The first edition of this work was published in 1926, the second in
1926, and the third in 1927. The third edition is cited unless it is indicated otherwise.
PrA.vm% [The Truth]. Official gazette of the Communist party.
R. S. F. S. R. LAws. SOBRANIE Uz -Na onz u RNSFORnLZ==,r RJArCRM-1MEnSfWsK0oG
PRATr_.!s'A R. S. F. S. R. [Collection of Enactments and Decrees of the Workers' and
Peasants' Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic]. Law journal of the
R. S. F. S. R., which is the largest constituent of the Union, and whose organs were actually
confederate organs prior to 1923. Year and item number (statiia) under which the act
cited appeared are indicated. Acts promulgated in 1917 and 1918 have a joint consecutive
numbering.
SocaAmrsr LzoAaua. SoTsiuzs cI 'CsAVA Z. ou-osr' [formerly Z.% SOTrqBLv5r5eMS-
mu= Z-%xouoss. Monthly magazine of the Attorney-General of the Soviet Union and
his assistants. Begun in 1934.
166. Vysainhky, op. cit. supra note 164, at 9.
167. Stalin, op. cit. supra note 159, at 5.
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Sovxr Jusnca, SOVETSKAIA IusTsnA [formerly EZIIENEDEL'NIx SOVETSXOx INSTTS11
(Soviet Justice Weekly)]. Organ of the Commissariats of Justice and the Supreme Courts of
the U. S. S. R. and the R. S. F. S. R. Begun in 1922.
SoviEr LAW. SOVETSxOE PRAvo. Legal magazine published from 1922 to 1928 by the
Institute of Soviet Law in Moscow.
Sovir STATE. SoVErsKoE GOSUDAR STVO [formely: 1927-29, RVOLITruSIrA PRAVA
(Revolution of Law); 1930, SovFTsxoE GosuniARs'vo x REVOLIUTSIUA PRAVA (Soviet State
and Revolution of Law)]. Organ of the Institute of Law and Political Science of the
Communist Academy. Monthly, 1927-30; later bi-monthly.
STUCHKA, COURSE. STUCHxA, KURS SovErsicoo GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA [Course of the
Soviet Civil Law]. Tom I, Vvedenie v. Teorhi Grazhdanskogo Pravw [Introduction Into
the Theory of Civil Law] (Ist ed. 1927, 2d ed. 1931). Tom II, Obschaid Chast [General
Part] (1929). Tom III, Osobaia Chast [Special Part (individual rights, contracts, etc.)]
(1931).
U. S. S. R. LAWS. SOBRANIE ZAKONOV i RASPORIAZIENuI RABocuE-xREsTasrANKoo
PRAvIrEL'STVA S. S. S. R. [Collection of Law and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants'
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]. Federal law journal of the Soviet
Union. The year and item number under which the cited act appeared are given.
VYSHINSKY, COURSE. VYSHINsKY i UNDREVIcU, KURS UGOLOVNOGO PROTSESSA [Course
of Criminal Procedure]. Tom I, Sudoustroistvo [The Judiciary] (2d ed., Moskva, 1936).
VysHsIcY, JuDIcIARy. VYSHiNsxY, StuousTRoisTvo S. S. S. R. [The Judiciary of the
U. S. S. R.]. Consists of five separate essays published as separate volumes in the first and
second editions (1934), and united in one volume in the revised third edition (1935), which
edition is cited unless otherwise indicated.
